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Executive Summary 
1. This study was undertaken in April 1996 jointly by NRI and the Plunkett 
Foundation and is the last of four country case studies involving Ghana, Uganda, Mali 
and Zimbabwe. 
2. During field work government staff and representatives from the official aid 
programmes, the NGOs and the private sector were interviewed as well as members of 
groups identified for case study work. Contacts were made with the Zimbabwean 
Farmers Union and the Co-operative Movement both at national and provincial level. 
3. Since 1990 the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme has led to a number 
of significant policy changes in the agricultural sector. However the implementation 
of a liberalisation strategy by the Zimbabwean government has proceeded more 
gradually than in other countries in the region. This may have slowed down the 
development of private sector alternatives to government service provision. 
4. During field work it became very clear that many people across the agricultural 
sector feel that co-operatives have failed. Even the government's attitude is now 
purely pragmatic and it has made it clear that it will not continue subsidising loss 
making co-operatives. 
5. Given this background, despite wide consultation, little evidence was available to 
suggest that there are many viable farmer controlled co-operatives in Zimbabwe (with 
the important exception of co-operatives registered under the Companies Act which 
are run by commercial farmers) or that major donors are continuing to support the co-
operative movement. 
6. The apparent absence of viable formal co-operatives in Zimbabwe, especially at 
the primary level, had an impact on field work. Groups identified for case study work 
tended to be less formal and, because their operations were much more limited and 
they were not trading in their own right, they did not have written records or bank 
accounts. 
7. A major finding of the research was the extent to which linkage arrangements 
between the private sector and farmer groups are widely supported by a range of 
interests across the sector. Support for this approach has been expressed from within 
government (and in the field AGRITEX staff provide practical support), by the 
Zimbabwean Farmers Union, by a number of donors and NGOs and by players within 
the private sector itself. 
8. The apparent potential for the development of these relationships is in part due to 
the dualistic nature of Zimbabwean agriculture which creates possibilities for 
commercial farms to operate as procurement centres for outlying smallholders (for 
example for the supply of vegetables) and to the relatively well developed agro-
industrial sector in the country. This has relied in the past on either the state 
marketing system or commercial farmers for raw material supply but is now interested 
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to draw in the small-scale farmers, especially for the supply of lower value 
commodities which are becoming less attractive to commercial farmers. 
9. During fieldwork the research found examples of linkage arrangements between 
groups of farmers and private companies that were entirely the initiative of the private 
company itself and others where an NGO had acted as an intermediary between the 
farmers' group and the company. 
10. Services provided through these arrangements varied. Some companies restricted 
their operations to procurement whilst others were involved in pre-financing 
producers and even providing training. The motivation behind these initiatives ranges 
from the strictly commercial (smallholders produce more cheaply or at higher quality) 
to the developmental (the need to create a more inclusive commercial agricultural 
sector). 
11. The role of groups also varied. Where input distribution or tn.e'bulking up of a 
commodity for procurement was required by the company, groups played an 
important role. Additionally, group guarantees were used for pre-financing by the 
Cotton Company of Zimbabwe. In other examples, groups were not important and in 
one case the commercial company did not encourage them at all. The role of groups 
in representing their members' joint interests to the buyers, or even in negotiating 
prices, was less evident. 
12. The research suggested that NGOs have to date been far more proactive in 
establishing linkage arrangements than the official donors. Participatory 
methodologies used by these NGOs have increased client influence in the design of 
many NGO projects and research indicates that access to markets is identified by 
smallholders as a priority need. In addition among many NGOs a more commercial 
orientation has resulted from a growing interest in rural enterprise as an alternative 
income source for agricultural producers in marginal areas. 
13. Another feature of the NGO initiatives has been the emphasis attached to 
community mobilisation, training and self reliance. This is in contrast to some of the 
official donor initiatives which have imposed organisational structures on groups of 
farmers who do not have the capacity or experience to operate them effectively. 
14. The growing importance of linkage groups and the experience analysed suggest 
that there are a number of roles that policy makers and donors can play in assisting 
this process. 
. ... 
(a) Government and donors should give proper -e~phasis to marketing issues, 
including developing linkage arrangements, in all their agricultural programmes, 
especially those involving the training of front-line extension staff. AGRlTEX is 
already playing an important role in fostering links in some situations but there is a 
need to formalise this approach and provide appropriate training to staff. 
(b) However efforts by policy makers to replicate approaches developed by NGOs 
within government institutions may require institutional change, not simply the 
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retrammg of individuals already in post. The emphasis attached by ITDG to 
marketing issues was set within the context of an approach which was participatory 
and client driven. The difficulty of transferring such an approach to a large 
organisation, for example a government department, with well established procedures 
and operational modalities cannot be underestimated. 
(c) If AGRITEX extends its role in terms of marketing support, it will produce 
benefits for producers and traders/processors. Mechanisms to recover some part of 
these benefits should be considered by policy makers. 
(d) The issue of equity in farmer group/private company relationships is crucial to 
successful development. This is a highly sensitive issue and potential investors could 
easily be put off working with farmers if they felt government was likely to try and 
regulate the prices paid to producers. On the other hand, government and donors 
cannot provide official support to forms of development which do not give proper 
attention to the interests of all concerned. 
(e) Research may be needed on whether legal provision exists for registering farmer 
groups and associations which are not co-operatives but require some alternative legal 
identity in order to be granted access to loans. 
(f) Financing issues are likely to play a major role in determining the success of some 
linkage arrangements, especially those involving higher value products which require 
significant purchased inputs. Research is recommended on developing sustainable 
fmancing systems involving producers, a lending organisation and a buyer. 
(g) Direct support to commercial interests committed to working with smallholders 
could be facilitated through the establishment of a venture capital fund or through 
involving them more actively in setting priorities for national agricultural research and 
extension programmes. However arguments against the use of public resources for 
these sorts of activities should be carefully considered. 
(h) Indirect support to commercial interests could be facilitated by improving rural 
infrastructure, especially the transport network, which acts as a major disincentive to 
many buyers. 
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Introduction 
This is the last of four country case studies (Ghana, Uganda, Mali and Zimbabwe) on 
the role of farmer groups and enterprises in the provision of agricultural services in 
liberalised economies of Sub Saharan Africa. The research was commissioned by the 
Policy Research Programme of the Overseas Development Administration. 
Under liberalisation, as the direct role of government is reduced, new institutional 
arrangements are required to fill the gap created by the state's withdrawal from direct 
service provision, and the research is concerned with assessing the potential for co-
operative action by farmers to meet this challenge. In terms of agricultural services, 
the main focus of the research has been marketing and input supply, including the 
provision of financial services although some processing activities have also been 
included. 
The approach adopted in each country case study has been to briefly assess recent 
developments in the agricultural sector and the state of agricultural service provision 
and then to examine the role of groups within this. Attention is also given to the role 
of donors in supporting groups and agricultural services. The information gathered is 
used to identify and research examples of individual groups where group action 
appears to be successful. In a final report when the case studies have been completed, 
the authors will draw out the lessons and identify ways in which policy makers and 
donors can assist the process of sustainable farmer enterprise development through 
self-help. 
Country case study work in Ghana and Uganda, which was completed before the 
Zimbabwe visit (the Mali work was conducted almost simultaneously with the 
Zimbabwe study), provided much evidence to support the hypotheses which were 
developed as a result of earlier desk research (see Appendix 1 for a list of these 
hypotheses) concerning the features of successful group organisation and types of 
activity they are associated with. On issues relating to. the role of donors, there was 
plenty of evidence from the experiences of both official donors and NGOs to support 
the hypothesis that supply driven programmes can undermine rather than foster the 
establishment of sustainable and dynamic farmer organisations. 
The Ghana and Uganda research also highlighted other issues with relevance to the 
research theme that were not included among the original hypotheses. These were 
(a) the potential significance of links between private traders, processors and banks in 
facilitating the integration of smallholders into the wider economy and the role groups 
can play in this process; (b) the degree to which these relationships are equitable and 
the scope for external agents to ensure that they are; (c) evidence that successful 
group enterprise appears to be closely related to the ability of the group to insert itself 
into the mainstream rural economy; and (d) in relation to the formal co-operative 
movement, whether evidence of a decline in market share is a sign of the movement's 
failure to compete in the face of private sector competition. 
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Guided by these previous findings, research in Zimbabwe was w1dertaken in Ap1il by 
Rachel Stringtellow of NRI and Colin McKone of the Plunkett Foundation. Initial 
research involved interviews with government representatives, the Zimbabwean 
Farmers Union and major donors as well as NGOs with relevant programmes in the 
agricultural sector. It became apparent at an early stage that the kind of private sector 
linkages observed to a limited degree in the previous case study countries were far 
more prevalent in Zimbabwe and subsequently they became an important focus within 
the research. 
Finally, it should be noted that Rachel Stringfellow became ill and was not able to 
participate in the second part of the field work. Inevitably, tlus had some impact on 
the team's coverage of case study groups. 
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Section 1. Background 
1.1 Agriculture in Zimbabwe 
1.1.1 Sectoral overview 
Although accounting for only 15% of Zimbabwe's GDP, the agricultural sector plays 
a central role in Zimbabwe's economy· and society, providing employment and 
livelihood for about 70% of the population, raw materials which form the basis for 
nearly 60% of manufactured production, and accounting for some 40% of the 
country's merchandise exports. Except in drought years, Zimbabwe is largely self-
sufficient in basic foodstuffs and agricultural raw materials. 
Zimbabwe has a total land area of 39 million hectares. Of this total, 33 million is 
utilised for agricultural production, the remaining 6 million is reserved for National 
Parks and wildlife. The country is divided into five natural regions corresponding to 
annual rainfall and dominant farming systems. NR I has average rainfall of 1,050 mm 
p.a. and supports intensive agriculture and livestock production. NR II has 700-1,060 
mm p.a. confined to the summer months and is suitable for intensive farming. NR Ill 
has 650-800 mm p.a. with erratic rainfall patterns and seasonal droughts. It is suitable 
for semi-intensive farming with the dominant crops being maize, cotton and tobacco. 
NR IV has 450-600 mm p.a. with frequent seasonal droughts. Semi-extensive 
livestock and fodder and small grain production are the primary agricultural 
enterprises. NR V has less than 500 mm p.a. falling very erratically and is only 
suitable for extensive agriculture and livestock ranches. Approximately 80% of arable 
land is located in the areas with lower agricultural potential (NRs Ill, IV and V). 
More than three-quarters of the rural population farm on these lands. 
The agricultural economy comprises two major subsectors: the large-scale 
commercial farmers and the small-scale farmers. The 4,000 large-scale commercial 
farms are held under freehold title, the farmers are mostly white and they hold 33.4% 
of total agricultural land in Zimbabwe. The average farm size is 2,200 ha and 
together they account for 85% of total marketed agricultural output. These farmers 
produce a broad range of crops and livestock products making extensive use of 
machinery and other purchased inputs. 
The small-scale farming subsector comprises 1.2 million smallholder farm units in the 
communal lands (with a population of 5.6 million); 56,800 resettlement farms 
(population 426,000) and 8,500 small scale commercial farms. The communal 
farmers are grouped in 171 Trust or Communal Lands. Seventy per cent of these 
farmers are in NRs IV and V. They produce mainly maize (average yield 1-1.5 
tonnes/ha) and a limited range of food (small grains, groundnuts, bambara) and cash 
crops (predominantly maize and cotton, small amounts of sunflower) using family 
labour and hand implements. 
In April 1996 following several years of drought and decline in the agricultural sector, 
adequate rains (averaging at least 80% of normal rainfall) appeared to offer the 
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prospect of a good harvest and real sectoral growth of 1 0% in 1996 (The Herald 
18/4/96) . Production of maize was expected to rise by about 1.5 million tonnes and 
cotton to double from I 02,000 tonnes in 1995 to 226,000 tonnes (The Herald 
15/4/96). A good tobacco harvest was expected as a result of favourable growing 
conditions coinciding with strong demand for quality flue-cured tobacco. One of the 
most dynamic subsectors in the agricultural economy, flower and horticulture exports, 
was expected to maintain annual growth of about 25%. According to the Horticultural 
Promotion Council, Zimbabwe is now Africa's second largest exporter of flowers and 
fresh produce and in 1996 the value of exports is expected to reach Z$1 billion 
accounting for 3.5% of GDP (The Herald, 25/4/96). 
1.1.2 Government Policy since Independence 
1.1.2.1. The 1980s 
Following Independence the government actively tried to address the dualistic nature 
of agricultural development in Zimbabwe by extending to smallholders many 
agricultural services which had previously benefited only commercial farmers . For 
example marketing infrastructure and parastatal buying services were extended to 
communal areas. The number of Grain Marketing Board depots in communal areas 
rose from 3 in 1980 to 148 by 1985. Government set pan-territorial and pan-seasonal 
prices above export parity to create incentives to increase production, and farmers in 
the communal areas were required to sell controlled crops through the GMB depots or 
via approved and registered buyers. Public sector agricultural research and extension 
services were re-directed towards the problems of smallholders. 
At the centre of government policy was the promotion of hybrid maize which was 
believed to hold the key to boosting smallholder productivity. This policy required a 
considerable expansion in seed and fertiliser supply and distribution and was financed 
through the Small Farm Credit Scheme of the Agricultural Finance Corporation, with 
support from the World Bank's IDA. Unsecured loans were given out in kind in the 
form of "crop packs" (seed, fertiliser, chemicals) to be repaid via a "stop order" on 
payments by the marketing board. The Agricultural Service Co-operatives, which at 
Independence comprised 343 registered primary societies with a membership of 
70,000 conurnmal farmers, was given the main responsibility for input distribution. 
These policies led to a dramatic increase in output and marketed surpluses from the 
smallholder sector and it has been estimated that smallholder production of maize 
trebled in the decade after independence. Subsequent research has suggested that the 
beneficiaries of the system were a small group of surplus producing smallholder 
farmers and that the majority of communal farmers remained net consumers of grain, 
although they may have benefited through multiplier effects. As the government's 
policy of higher producer prices led to higher consumer prices, these farmers were 
taxed rather than assisted by the system. The single marketing system also 
concentrated the storage and processing of maize in the urban centres, inflating the 
price eventually paid by rural consumers. 
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Other weaknesses with these policies emerged. Low repayment rates for agricultural 
credit undermined the viability of the AFC's Small Farm Credit Scheme. Under the 
individual liability system the scheme was losing half of its capital stock each year, a 
completely unsustainable position (Bratton, 1986). Within the co-operative sector, a 
shortage of trained staff and inadequate storage and transport facilities combined with 
strong competition from private companies and from the GMB to lead to growing 
financial difficulties and a declining turnover. ASC's market share for input supply 
fell to 25% by 1988, a level of turnover inadequate to cover overhead costs. 
The GMB itself required massive subsidies to operate its distribution and purchasing 
network. During the second half of the 1980s, public enterprise losses, which 
included those of the GMB, accounted for 3-6% of GDP, the equivalent of 8-12% of 
government expenditure (Conway and Tyler, 1995). This burden on the public 
finances limited spending in other areas constraining economic growth and was a 
major reason for the decision by the government of Zimbabwe to implement an 
Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) in 1991. 
1.1.2.2. The ESAP 
Following the economic orthodoxy of the international lending organisations, the 
ESAP sought to stimulate investment and growth in the Zimbabwean economy 
through trade liberalisation and domestic deregulation, underpinned by appropriate 
fiscal and monetary policies. In the agricultural sector, this required the removal of 
buying monopolies held by the marketing boards in order to allow market forces a 
greater role in the marketing of agricultural products. Most consumer price controls 
were lifted as well as the subsidies associated with price controls. Maize meal and 
bread prices were decontrolled in 1993. 
However despite its professed commitment to free market policies, the government 
has remained a major force in agricultural markets. Budget allocation figures for the 
first half of the 1990s reveal that subsidies, parastatal losses and other exceptional 
measures have been the predominant form of government agricultural expenditure. 
For example the GMB has continued to offer floor prices to maize producers and to 
operate a substantial Food Reserve of nearly one million tonnes. During the 1990/91 
to 1994/95 period, the aggregate losses of the six major agricultural parastatals (the 
GMB, the Dairy Marketing Board, the Cotton Company, the Cold Storage 
Commission, the Agricultural Finance Corporation and the Agricultural Rural 
Development Authority) were equivalent to 44% of the actual expenditures made by 
the Ministry of Agriculture. The government's widespread provision of "drought 
packs" to communal farmers following a succession of droughts has maintained the 
government's role in supplying inputs. The high overall cost of these policies has 
limited public resources available for research and extension and other services to 
enhance productivity in agriculture. 
Recent policy and structural reforms giving several parastatals significant operational 
autonomy have led to the restoration of profitability for the Cotton Company of 
Zimbabwe, the AFC and the DMB. Placing the GMB on a commercial footing has 
been a longer process because of the political sensitivity of grain marketing, but in 
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April 1996 the GMB appeared to be operating on commercial lines and was in the 
process of rationalising its depot network. The government remains committed to the 
Strategic Food Reserve despite the high cost and it will reimburse the GMB directly 
for maintaining this and for carrying out any other "social" market functions (e.g. 
distributing grain in a drought year). 
1.2 The Provision of Agricultural Services under the ESAP to Smallholders 
1.2.1 Input supply 
As a consequ~::nce of government expenditure reductions under ESAP, agribusiness 
distribution networks developed during the 1980s are breaking down. Credit is much 
reduced for unsecured borrowers through the AFC (see 1.2.3 below) and the GMB, 
the co-operative movement and AGRITEX have a much reduced distribution 
capacity. 
However since 1991 the government has been directing substantial amounts of public 
funds and donor assistance at the smallholder sector through emergency drought relief 
programmes. Farmers are given drought packs consisting of seed and fertiliser. The 
first was in 1991 and the following year, following a very severe drought, assistance 
was provided to 940,000 smallholders with World Bank support. Government 
assistance continued in 1993 and 1994, despite these being years of relatively good 
harvests, and in 1995, following another severe drought, government distributed 
drought relief to between 800,000 and 1 million smallholders, although this time on a 
loan rather than grant basis. 
Whilst acknowledging the political imperatives forcing government to act in the face 
of an emergency, some donors believe that the government's un-targeted response 
has undermined the development of private marketing systems for input delivery as 
well as efforts by the AFC to introduce more discipline into smallholder lending 
programmes. However the good harvest expected in 1996 will make it very difficult 
for the government to justify an emergency programme. Smallholders may therefore 
have to rely increasingly on the private sector. 
Over 50% of all agricultural inputs are already purchased directly by farmers from 
Windmill, ZFC or their major dealerships in Harare or Bulawayo. However fewer 
than 60 dealers are supplying the country's 1. 2 million smallholders. The need for 
the private sector to extend its distribution network was acknowledged by one of 
Windmill Fertiliser's senior managers with responsibility for business in the 
communal areas. He is aware of communal lands where there are viable business 
opportunities in which the company could expand its sales to smallholders. What the 
company lacks is a network of reliable traders to sell to. It is considering plans to 
train its own agents, perhaps recruiting young agriculture graduates and providing 
them with the necessary business training. But this approach would still not 
overcome the main constraint facing new traders- the need to offer Windmill security, 
conventionally in the form of a bank guarantee. In this context, CARE's AGENT 
programme, which is discussed in Section 3.2.5, is of considerable relevance. 
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1.2.2 Output marketing 
Until the end of 1995, GMB's continuing presence through its depots in the 
communal areas provided at least some residual state marketing infrastructure, albeit 
at very high public cost. The decision to implement an extensive programme of depot 
closures from January 1996, reducing numbers from 74 to 24 (plus 14 seasonal 
depots), has generated concern about the ability of the private sector to provide at a 
fair price the services that smallholders need to remain integrated into wider markets. 
In the absence of such services, some commentators believe there will be a reversion 
to greater subsistence production, or that government will step back in and directly 
subsidise the operation of public depots (Brighton Kutyauripo, Economist, GMB, 
pers.comm.). The ZFU is currently proposing to government that it take over the 
management of some of the former GMB depots. 
The alternative view, which is supported from within the Ministry of Agriculture itself 
(Takavarasha, 1994), is that public policy should be directed towards encouraging the 
development of an efficient private trading system where increasingly the actual 
forces of demand and supply influence production decisions among smallholders. 
The constraints to this process are not underestimated, particularly the problems of 
rural transport and access by smallholders and traders to finance, but the starting point 
is that the previous state system had become unsustainable as well as inefficient, 
especially in food deficit areas of the country. A return to the old system is not 
therefore a viable option. 
Takavarasha expresses considerable optimism about the potential for direct 
relationships between farmers and processors and other end users of agricultural 
commodities, citing the example of the Chibuku Breweries and its purchase of 
sorghum from smallholders (see Section 4.2). As will become apparent later in this 
report, Zimbabwe does appear to offer considerable scope for these types of 
arrangements. 
However rapid appraisals of farmers' grain market participation undertaken in 
February 1996 by NRI/ODP (NRI, 1996) suggest that the pattern of grain and grain 
product purchases that prevailed in the late 1980s has not much changed. Purchases 
of grain from informal traders are small, except where deficit areas are close to 
surplus ones. In deficit areas purchases from the GMB predominate, even though 
prices on the jnformal market are lower, suggesting that in these areas little grain is 
available from informal traders. The authors recommend further research into the 
constraints facing the development of private trading systems in these areas. 
1.2.3 Financial services 
By 1990, 80% of the AFC's communal farmer portfolio and 68% of its small scale 
commercial portfolio were in arrears (Takavarasha, 1994). These high default rates 
created a serious crisis in the AFC, which was reflected in a dwindling number of 
1 This was carried out in Mutoko Central Communal Land, Chivi South Central Communal Land and 
Zimuto Communal Land 
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borrowers. By 1991192 the number of borrowers represented only about 5% of the 
smallholder farmer population. 
To bring down costs and improve borrower discipline, the AFC introduced a group 
lending scheme with the support of the World Bank. Under this scheme funds were 
on lent to smallholders on a joint liability basis. Group selection criteria included 
group membership of between 10 and 50 members; the adoption of a constitution; the 
ability to generate group fmancial resources; the operation of group activities for input 
supply and marketing; and the ability to keep records. By 1992/93 the number of 
groups involved in this programme had reached 246, comprising some 4,000 
beneficiaries. Repayment rates were substantially better than for individual loans to 
smallholder farmers. 
In 1993 the AFC introduced a linkage scheme involving NGOs as intermediaries 
between groups of farmers and financial institutions in providing credit to smallholder 
farmers. Two models were introduced: the Direct Linkage Model, under which 
groups took loans directly from the AFC while group guidance was supplied by the 
NGO, and the Indirect Linkage Model which placed the NGO as an intermediary 
between the groups and the AFC, requiring it to provide a guarantee for the loan. 
Interest rates charged were broadly market rates of interest. The linkage scheme has 
received support from a number of donors including the World Bank, IFAD and the 
EU. 
At a workshop to evaluate the programme in March 1996, participants stressed the 
importance of encouraging substantial savings among group members to reduce the 
total credit requirement of borrowers and to guarantee group loans. By providing 
their own security in this way, groups could become independent of the NGOs. 
However one technical constraint to introducing savings within the linkage scheme is 
that the AFC is prevented by its constitution from mobilising savings. This situation 
is expected to change in the near future. 
A strong savings culture in Zimbabwe underscores the need for the AFC to adopt a 
more holistic attitude to financial services. The resources which could be mobilised if 
it took deposits would provide funds for expanding its lending operations. Most 
savings clubs in Zimbabwe come under an umbrella organisation called the Self Help 
Development Foundation which has assisted over 11,000 savings clubs with a 
membership of over 200,000. The Post Office Savings Bank is also very strong in 
Zimbabwe. 
The development of policy within the AFC over the last few years, combined with the 
strong savings culture in the country, suggests that programmes in the future will have 
a strong savings component. This is entirely consistent with developments in other 
countries visited during the course of this research, and with developments in 
countries else,vhere in Africa. 
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Section 2. Farmer organisations and groups in the provision of agricultural 
services: the co-operatives and the Zimbabwe Farmers Union 
Farmer organisations in Zimbabwe are diverse in nature, taking many forms and draw 
on support from Government, the commercial farming sector and both national and 
international non-government organisations. Against the background of a relatively 
strong commercial agricultural economy, some significant groups of small-scale and 
communal farmers have organised themselves, or have been assisted to organise by 
commercial companies and by non-government organisations active in the field of 
rural development. Highlights of these developments are described in this and the 
following two sections of the report. This section looks at the formal co-operative 
sector and the Zimbabwean Farmers Union; Section 3 covers the role of donor 
agencies in supporting farmer group initiatives and Section 4 looks at how the private 
sector has worked with and sometimes promoted groups to establish marketing 
arrangements. 
2.1 Co-operatives 
Large scale commercial farmers in Zimbabwe have benefited from co-operative forms 
of organisation since 1909. In 1989 it was reported that 9 marketing and supply 
societies were in existence with some 4000 large-scale farmer members (World Bank 
1994). At Independence in 1980 there were 343 registered co-operatives with a 
membership of 70,000 communal farmers. Under the auspices of the Ministry of 
Community and Co-operative Development and Women's Affairs (MCCWA), co-
operative development· expanded considerably. The rapid growth particularly of 
Collective Co-operatives strained the resources of the Government to train and 
supervise the members and consequently a high failure rate was experienced. The 
collective form of production favoured by the Marxist-oriented policies of the newly 
independent Government led to large numbers of resettled ex-combatants forming 
collective co-operatives in which production and labour is shared, to produce a 
common harvest with subsequent division of profits. Many of these are currently 
inactive or have reorganised themselves with a division of the once shared land 
resource into individual plots, where families are responsible for their own production 
and reap the benefits of their own labour directly. 
All these changes have resulted in a widespread feeling within and without 
Government that co-operatives have largely failed. At the same time development 
agencies are still encouraging and supporting forms of farmer organisation over which 
hangs a question as to the most appropriate form of registration. Weaknesses in farmer 
organisational development can be identified in some of the Official Development 
Aid programmes (see Section 3.1 below). 
Zimbabwe has two forms of co-operative organisation with one form of registration 
under the Co-operative Societies Act and another option to register as a Co-operative 
Company under the Companies Act. This latter form of registration is used by the 
commercial farmers for their co-operatives as it is outside government supervision 
and provides considerable freedom to operate and manage a commercial business. It 
17 
seems likely that this form of registration will be increasingly used as government 
resources available to monitor and supervise co-operatives recede under the economic 
structural adjustment programme. Furthermore, the nature of farmer co-operation and 
the predominance of linkages with the commercial sector lend themselves more 
favourably to forms of registration that allow complete commercial freedom to 
manage an effective agribusiness, without Government interference. 
2.1.1. Agricultural Service Co-operatives 
Agricultural Service Co-operatives are found at Provincial level and operate input 
supply and marketing services for communal farmers and small-scale farmers. One of 
the largest is the Masvingo Co-operative Union formed in 1966 and currently with 
131 primary societies in membership throughout the Province. It has six branches at 
District level and members visit their nearest branch to conduct business. It purchases 
inputs in bulk and distributes to District branches. Primary co-operatives collect 
individual orders from their members and a single order is given to the union branch. 
Members pay cash to the branch for their supplies but the branch is allowed 7 days 
credit with the Union in Masvingo. Annual turnover on input supplies is between 2.5 
to 3m Z$ ( £179,00 to 215,000). It has 33 staff(recently reduced from 85). 
The union aiso operates as an agent for marketing crops. Last year it handled 200 tons 
maize, 150 tons groundnuts, 100 tons sunflower, 50 tons sorghum and millet and 30 
tons of beans. The manager felt that he could greatly increase the marketing service 
but transport is the major constraint. A further constraint is that the branches can only 
take the crop on credit from the farmer and average pay out to the farmer takes two 
weeks. Since liberalisation new buying companies have appeared in Masvingo and 
one such company Midland Buyers will pay in 48 hours. This is creating competition 
for the co-operative and in order to compete effectively it would need to reorganise its 
cashflow. 
The co-operative is clearly under capitalised and currently has only Z$10,000 share 
holdings. At primary level every 20 farmers pay Z$1 0 share holding and a joining fee 
of 50 et. Plus individual share holding of Z$1.50. The Board of Directors have 
recommended that individual share holding be raised to Z$20 per farmer. This should 
be seen in the light of ZFU's current policy of trying to recruit individual farmers at 
an annual subscription of Z$20. The co-operative is also trying to increase member 
savings in the co-operative which are still small and does this through a system of 
levy on input supplies. 
Since 1986 the co-operative has had assistance from GTZ in the form of technical 
training (discontinued), donated trucks, marketing assistance and an interest free loan 
for purchase of input supplies to allow the co-operative to order in bulk at the 
beginning of the crop season. 
The co-operative has the overall appearance of being well managed with a good 
management information system and tidy warehouse, but its under capitalisation and 
clear dependence on continuing support from GTZ must give rise to concern over its 
future viability. Trading conditions are likely to become even more competitive in the 
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liberalised market and with interest on bank loans to co-operatives at 25% they will 
need to work harder to stay in business. 
We suggested that the future must lie in raising farmer equity in the co-operative, 
increasing fixed deposit savings and linking share holding with business transacted by 
members to continuously raise the share holding levels. Unless urgent steps are taken 
to correct the deficiencies and replace the drip feed support from GTZ, Masvingo Co-
operative Union is unlikely to survive in the new economic order. The manager is 
well aware of the problems and is working on them actively with the Board. He points 
out that the major drought of 1993 severely affected their co-operative as it did many 
other agricultural enterprises in Zimbabwe. Current interest rates do not encourage 
investment other than low risk, high return ventures. 
2.1.2 Organisation of Collective Co-operatives in Zimbabwe (OCCZIM) 
Following Independence in 1980, extensive settlement schemes were used to place ex-
combatants onto farming land which was compulsorily purchased from the large scale 
agricultural commercial sector. These settlements were organised in the form of 
collective (production) co-operatives mainly during 1983 to 85. Given strong 
Government support in their early years, they increasingly faced the realities of 
farming in a drought prone climate especially when financial support tailed off in later 
years, and they had to become self-supporting. In order to strengthen their 
organisation and management, a number of donors provided training and material 
goods in the form of tractors and implements. Eventually the Organisation of 
Collective Co-operatives in Zimbabwe was formed and became a focal point for 
delivering donor assistance to the co-operatives. This organisation is described as an 
independently funded, Zimbabwean grass-roots controlled, national NGO. 
OCCZIM has a head Office in Harare with a small Secretariat including national 
advisers. In each Province it has a branch office and Masvingo Provincial Union is a 
typical example. It is headed by a Provincial Co-operative Development Officer, a 
Business Adviser and an Administrative Secretary. It provides a range of services to 
its members, the collective co-operatives in Masvingo Province. These services 
include general advice and training on all aspects of co-operative law, registration, 
democratic management and working practices, finances, record-keeping, production, 
marketing and business growth. Increasingly, OCCZIM Masvingo is focusing on 
developing the business aspects of co-operative enterprise, in a bid to bring its 
membership to the point where they are self-reliant, and able to grow and prosper 
under their own momentum. 
The branch provides services to 4 collective farms whose membership ranges from 21 
to 56 members. Since last year the collective farms have been split up into individual 
plots and this has facilitated new levels of production and efficiency. In addition 
OCCZIM assists 25 gardening groups and a number of off-farm production groups, 
particularly sewing co-operatives. Some of the services at the collective farms are 
shared and members pay for tractor services. 
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Current donor support has come from Terre des Hommes, a German agency, and a 
Swiss agency which has provided cattle fattening loans. The Business Consultancy 
Service is supported through a linkage with Middlesborough, UK which set up a Trust 
Fund with support from Comic Relief. A Business Consultant was sent out from 
Middlesborough for a two year period to develop the Consultancy Service. The 
demand on the services of the OCCZIM branch far outstrips their ability to deliver, 
with funding a major problem. The nature of the co-operatives is changing from a 
collective approach to production, towards one in which members organise their own 
primary production and share certain common services. In this way they derive the 
full benefits of their labour and obtain job satisfaction. It allows individuals to 
develop at their own pace and reap the rewards of their increased efforts. 
2.1.3 Current Policy Trends in Co-operative Development 
All the indications are that farmer organisation under a Co-operative Societies Act 
registration is in decline with various agencies and individuals searching for new 
forms of co-operation that do not emphasise co-operatives because of their past 
problems and the legacy of failure. It seems generally accepted that a corporate legal 
identity is essential if farmer groups are to access loans from institutions like the 
Agricultural Finance Company who up till now have required this qualification. 
Development agencies such as the Agricultural and Rural Development Agency 
(ARDA) implementing an EU project in Mashonaland East, have formed groups and 
associations, but so far have not advised on registration. These groups now facing 
marketing problems require some legitimacy and may become registered as a Co-
operative Company. This is the current thinking of an EU Institutions Adviser. 
The Director of Field Operations-AGRITEX commented that collective co-operatives 
have been a failure but nevertheless farmer groups need assistance with forms of 
organisation and that co-operatives are not necessarily the best way forward. The 
Marketing Director of ZFU when talking about ZFU's policy of helping farmer 
groups to form linkages with commercial companies for marketing, felt that co-
operatives were only one way of institutionalising farmer group enterprise. 
Choice of registration/incorporation for farmer group enterprises are particularly in 
focus in Zimbabwe in relation to the emerging forms of co-operation between farmer 
groups and commercial companies. In general the more commercial the partner 
enterprise, the greater the mistrust of co-operatives. The Managing Director of 
Hortico, a commercial vegetable grower in the export trade, sees co-operation with 
communal farmers as a two stakeholder process with the company and the group of 
farmers. The existence of a co-operative would for him represent a third stakeholder 
likely to have its own agenda and demands that would detract from the key two way 
interaction between the producers and the processing/marketing functions (see Section 
4.3). 
This raises questions of whether more formal farmer institutions are needed for these 
new forms of co-operation when the association of farmers is not trading as an 
activity, but acting solely as a liaison group for the purpose of forming a linkage with 
a specialised commercial marketing organisation. 
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2.2 The Zimbabwe Farmers Union (ZFU) 
The ZFU is one of two national farmers' organisations in Zimbabwe. The 
Commercial Farmers' Union represents the mainly white commercial farmers in the 
country and traces its roots back to the 1920s. The ZFU was formed in 1991 when the 
Zimbabwean National Farmers' Union, founded in 1938 by small-scale commercial 
farmers, joined together with the National Farmers' Association of Zimbabwe which 
was founded in 1980 to represent farmers from the Tribal Trust Lands (now the 
Communal Areas). 
The ZFU has a broad membership representing five types of farmers: communal area, 
resettlement area, small-scale commercial, large-scale commercial (indigenous), and 
peri-urban plotholders. In 1993/94, ZFU had more than 164,000 members in 
communal and resettlement areas (representing 17% of all farmers in this group) and 
approximately 3,400 small-scale commercial members (representing 40% of all 
farmers of this type). Base units of the organisation are clubs (6,000) organised at the 
village level in the communal and resettlement areas and producers' associations 
(125) which are organised at the ward level and bring together the small-scale 
commercial farmers. The boundaries of the base units tend to be very fluid and the 
activities they are involved in quite varied as they respond to the local needs and 
demands of members. 
The ZFU is recognised by government as the legitimate representative of communal, 
resettlement and small-scale commercial interests. Its independence from government 
is formally guaranteed by the Constitution and one of its important functions is to 
lobby government on behalf of its members. Following the introduction of the ESAP 
the position adopted by the ZFU was initially highly critical, arguing for the retention 
of fixed prices and government marketing and input delivery services. This reaction 
contrasted with that of the large-scale commercial farmers who saw in the 
liberalisation programme opportunities for new investments. Some commentators 
argue that the ZFU' s response did little to advance the interests of its members. 
However in more recent years the ZFU has accepted that liberalised markets provide 
the framework in which its members have to operate and it is directing resources at 
assisting them to take the best advantage of the situation. Since 1994 it has had a 
Marketing Department (this comprises a chief marketing officer in Harare and eight 
provincial officers). 
The Department is involved in a variety of initiatives to improve members' access to 
agricultural services within the liberalised system. At a an ideological level it is still 
attracted to the idea of co-operatives and from July 1996 a new pilot project supported 
by the Swedish Co-operative Centre will attempt to build up the operational capacity 
of groups of farmers to enable them to trade on their own behalf. However a 
commitment to a co-operative strategy has to be balanced against the general 
perception in the country and amongst farmers that traditional forms of co-operative 
enterprise have failed. The ZFU is therefore promoting types of co-operation amongst 
its groups that allow members to take advantage of the scale economies of group 
action without requiring them to invest substantial managerial or financial inputs. 
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Farmers are encouraged to form marketing groups to bulk up their production and the 
union provides assistance with finding a market by linking groups directly with 
processors or the Commodities Exchange. According to the Marketing Department 
there is great potential for developing these arrangements as many agro-processing 
companies are interested in directly procuring from groups of smallholders. In 
Section 4 a number of existing arrangements of this kind are reviewed. This linkage 
strategy, which has emerged as a major theme in the research on farmer controlled 
enterprises, has also been adopted by a number of the NGOs in Zimbabwe (see 
Section 3.2). 
Other activities promoted among its members by the ZFU to improve access to 
agricultural se!"vices are to encourage groups to bulk up orders for inputs and to set up 
savings schemes. All ZFU members are entitled to a 14% sales tax exemption on 
purchased inputs and at a national level the union is lobbying to open up the domestic 
market in agricultural input supply (which is presently dominated by only two 
companies) by bringing in a foreign supplier. With regard to storage services, it is 
lobbying government to allow its members access to government owned warehousing 
facilities that have been taken out of operation by the GMB. 
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Section 3. Farmer organisations and groups in the provision of agricultural 
services: The role of donor agencies 
3.1 Official donors 
A number of donors have been involved in projects to improve agricultural service 
provision to smallholders. As mentioned in the section above, GTZ has provided 
support to the co-operative sector since 1986. In Masvingo this appears to have had a 
positive impact in terms of good management but there is some doubt about the 
sustainability of the co-operative's operations once support from GTZ has been 
withdrawn. 
The EU has been involved since 1988 with a major project to assist smallholders 
involved in horticulture production in Mashonaland East. Though the project initially 
focused on improving production and productivity, a second phase has emphasised 
marketing and institutional development in response to problems experienced by 
many growers in marketing increased production. The lack of transport facilities was 
identified as a major constraint and the formation of farmer associations to operate 
donated trucks has been the strategy adopted by the project to overcome this. 
In practise the operation of the associations has been disappointing. The underlying 
problem appears to be one of ownership. According to an institutional consultant's 
findings, membership of the associations was perceived by farmers joining them to be 
a means to an end: if sufficient farmers joined, the donor would provide a free truck. 
Once acquired, with no resources of their own invested in the truck, members tended 
to view it as the responsibility of the donor, and not their own. This attitude was 
compounded by the poor performance of the association committees, elected by 
members to manage the association's marketing activities. These received little 
training and guidance from the project, despite the complexities of the operations they 
were involved in. Consultants brought in to evaluate the associations in May 1995 
found them to be neither profitable nor sustainable. 
The EU is now working hard to try and mitigate some of these problems. However 
for the purposes of this research, which is conce~ed to identify the most appropriate 
forms of government and donor intervention, more fundamental questions need to be 
asked about the original design of the project. In his evaluation, the institutional 
consultant highlighted the fact that the concepts of self-reliance and empowerment of 
farmers were not clearly elaborated at the design stage. This allowed a project design 
to be adopted (the provision of a free truck) which had the effect of increasing 
dependency among beneficiaries. It also proved inappropriate because the demands 
made on the farmers' elected representatives to operate the associations' services 
proved to be beyond their existing capacity and experience and little provision was 
made in the project to provide them with the necessary skills through training. 
The EU experience in Mashonaland East contrasts with the approaches adopted by 
some of the NGOs in their projects. These experiences are reviewed in Section 3.2 
below, but the main difference is the emphasis attached by the NGOs to participation 
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and self reliance. This has had the effect of creating what appear to be far more 
sustainable approaches to marketing problems. 
Over the last few years, the British ODA has been supporting an innovative collector 
wells pilot project to provide communal farmers with drinking water and irrigation for 
horticultural production (Lovell et al., 1996; Waughray et al., 1996). Technically the 
pilot project appears to have been successful and the project's objectives of providing 
drinking water and increasing the nutritional status and income of beneficiaries 
through increased horticultural production have been met. However in a way that 
mirrors earlier EU experience in Mashonaland East, the original project design 
assigned little importance to marketing issues and as a result beneficiaries are finding 
that they are encountering difficulties in marketing surplus vegetable production. 
The ODA is aware of this and is exploring possibilities for addressing the problem. It 
is to be hoped that they will learn from the mistakes of the EU project and support the 
development of sustainable marketing systems. The ITDG project and the CARE 
AGENTs programme reviewed below provide some possible approaches. 
A bias towards technical and production oriented objectives in project design at the 
expense of consideration of marketing issues is a common feature in official aid 
projects. The early phases of the EU and ODA projects provide evidence of this in 
Zimbabwe. 
Another project reviewed during the course of the research confirms this bias. The 
FAO's proposed Farm-level Applied Research Methods in East and Southern Africa 
(F ARMESA) (FAO Project Document, 1996) is a regional project which aims to 
improve the processes through which new technologies are identified, adapted and 
applied by exposing existing personnel involved in agricultural development to more 
participatory techniques. However despite adopting "a holistic, systems approach to 
farm-household and community level analysis", it makes no reference to marketing 
issues. The market oriented work of the NGOs reviewed below, which has been 
highly participatory, is in response to smallholder demand. Given this the FARMESA 
project, which includes a training and education component for agricultural personal, 
might want to consider including marketing within this. Agricultural workers would 
then be better equipped to advise smallholders on marketing issues if these were 
raised as a matter of concern. 
In fact interviews with a number of commercial farmers and agribusiness companies 
conducted during the course of the research suggests that in practice AGRITEX staff 
are already involved in assisting smallholders with marketing issues through the role 
they play as intermediaries between farmers and commercial operators. More details 
are provided in Section 4 below. 
USAID Zimbabwe stands out as an exception to the technical/production bias 
identified among other donors as it attaches great importance to marketing issues. Its 
strategy for improving marketing services to smallholders is to provide support to 
commercial agriculture and agribusiness with linkages to smallholders. It is presently 
involved in formulating an agribusiness scheme which would provide assistance to 
contract farming or outgrower scheme operators working with smallholders. 
24 
However the role of farmer groups in such operations is perceived as potentially 
controversial: commercial companies often prefer to deal directly with producers 
rather than through their representatives who might introduce agendas of their own, as 
mentioned in Section 2.1.3. 
3.2 Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) 
As in all developing countries, Zimbabwe has a rich variety of national and 
international non-government organisations. The international NGOs are involved in 
rural development and some like CARE and ITDG are employing new techniques and 
approaches to sustainable agricultural development. The national NGOs like Silveira 
House (Catholic Development Commission) and ENDA have a focus on sustainable 
development und follow policies which recognise the drought prone nature of Sub-
Saharan Africa and the scarcity of resources. They promote permaculture, sustainable 
organic farming in all its forms and the use and widespread distribution of small 
grains (sorghum and millet). Both ITDG and ENDA have linked farmers groups 
producing sorghum and millet to commercial buyers including Chibuku Breweries 
and the Seed Company of Zimbabwe. 
3.2.1 National Association of Non-Government Organisations (NANGO) 
NANGO is an umbrella organisation of NGOs both national and international. It 
produces publications that list the organisations and describes their nature and 
activities. 
3.2.2 Intermediate Technology Development Group (ITDG) 
Information on ITDG's activities in Zimbabwe was initially obtained from Comic 
Relief in London who are supporting the development work with farmer groups in 
Wards 21 and 23 in Chivi District of Masvingo Province. This is a harsh marginal, 
drought prone area with almost a constant water deficit. Crops grown are small grain 
cereals, sunflower, groundnuts and bambara nuts. ITDG were visited in Harare to 
obtain background information on their development approach and subsequent visits 
were made to the field in the company of AGRITEX Extension officers who work 
closely with ITDG. 
The work which started in 1991, involves promoting a development dialogue with the 
farmers to analyse their problems. Farmers are encouraged to form farmer groups and 
garden groups. The nature of these groups is essentially an association of people 
facing similar problems (marketing problems, water shortage, harsh environment). 
They have been encouraged to form village based groups with representatives going 
forward to serve on an inter-village committee. No material assistance is given other 
than training in problem analysis and transformation for change. This training is 
carried out by Silveira House (see Section 3.2.4.1 below) and involves both farmers 
and AGRITEX staff. The focus of the training is how to promote sustainable 
agriculture in low potential drought prone areas. The answer is seen to lie in 
introducing more innovation and better organisation using traditional forms of 
organisation. Institutional surveys were carried out to examine the leadership and 
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organisational patterns of the people, with the intention of building on these and 
introducing new skills and ideas. The fundamental organisational building blocks start 
with traditional Kraal Heads and this contrasts with many other group formation 
approaches that tend to encourage formation of groups that cut across traditional lines 
of leadership. 
Part of the training of the farmers is designed to create a demand structure in which 
farmers become aware of their problems and some of the solutions, so that they can 
articulate their needs and promote action themselves. ITDG found that the existing 
farmer clubs promoted by AGRlTEX and ZFU were composed of the elite with large 
numbers of disadvantaged and economically weak producers excluded. They wanted 
to find a way of involving all the people in the development process. 
Groups have up to 70 members composed of smaller traditional groups/families and 
this umbrella group affiliates to the ZFU. The activities of the clubs consist of labour 
sharing and information sharing which, although traditional, had fallen out of practice 
and is now being re-introduced with enthusiasm. Marketing activities are also 
becoming increasingly important as new forms of organisation and the reintroduction 
of traditional moisture conservation techniques are assisting farmers to move steadily 
out of subsistence agriculture into cash cropping with sorghum, caster beans, 
groundnuts and millet. Efforts are made by the groups to establish marketing links 
with buyers in the towns and they have been successful so far in making a link with 
Chibuku Breweries (see Section 4.2 ). In six villages, nine farmer clubs and 10 garden 
groups have been initiated. 
A visit to ITDG's project in Chivi is described in Section 5. 
3.2.3 Environment and Development Activities (ENDA) 
This NGO is a national NGO that is linked with similar national agencies around 
Africa. ENDA describes itself as a non-profit organisation working with people in 
rural and urban areas striving to improve their lives and their resources in a 
sustainable way. Their work with farmer groups, which involves re-introducing small 
grain cereals, seed multiplication and selling certified seed stock to a commercial seed 
company, is of particular interest to this research study. 
The project known as the Zimbabwe Seeds Action Network is funded by NOVIB and 
co-ordinates the seed supply of several Zimbabwean, Zambian, Botswana and 
Mozambican NGOs. The network promotes the conservation of plant genetic 
resources and the multiplication of indigenous food plants in semi-arid regions of 
SADCC. Agronomic seed demonstration and multiplication plots are established with 
communal households to evaluate the performance of indigenous crops. Seed and 
food processing centres are being developed with communal farmers for the 
conservation and multiplication of the classified seed varieties for self-sufficiency in 
five pilot Wards affecting 6000 families. 
A visit to two farmer groups involved with the ENDA programme is described in 
Section 5.2. 
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3.2.4 NGOs providing training 
3.2.4.1 Silveira House 
Silveira House is a Catholic sponsored Development Centre with a very high 
reputation for training and the promotion of sustainable rural development. In addition 
to training they have taken a strong lead in promoting development dialogues with 
other agencies on such subjects as structural adjustment and the effect on the urban 
and rural poor. As noted above, the ITDG programme has used Silveira House ' s 
programme "Training for Transformation" for farmer leaders and AGRlTEX staff. 
Other programmes at Silveira House include micro-enterprise development, 
vocational training and work with youth groups. 
3.2.4.2 Self-Help Development Foundation 
This Foundation is a national NGO which promotes and assists savings clubs in 
Zimbabwe. Originally supported by OXFAM more than 30 years ago it has since then 
assisted 11,000 savings groups, each consisting of 15 to 30 individuals with a total of 
over 200,000 savers across Zimbabwe. 70% ofthe members are women. 
The policy of the SDF is to promote saving for a purpose rather than for its own sake. 
Members take part in programmes which are financially within their reach and which 
satisfy a nee,d, such as food security or the establishment of an income generating 
project. The Foundation has been supported by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation of 
Germany. 
It has a particular relevance for helping individual group members or the group itself, 
to raise capital for bulk input supply purchase, a marketing development fund, or 
perhaps hire of transport for crop marketing. With sufficient savings a group can 
avoid the use of credit which is expensive (23%) or can use its fixed savings as 
collateral for a larger loan. With the assistance of CARE a credit training programme 
is being designed and will be field tested with the intention of developing systems 
necessary for SDF to manage a credit programme. 
SDF could have an important role in assisting group enterprises to raise capital for 
their joint ventures with commercial producers and contract marketing systems. In 
this respect they could be of interest to Hortico who are looking for ways of helping 
smallholders finance the cost of horticultural crop production for export (see Section 
4.3). 
3.2.4.3 Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES) 
FES is a German NGO and currently has an EU contract to assist the Zimbabwe 
Farmers Union with staff training at all levels. In 1995/96 a series of seminars have 
been organised with ZFU to examine critical issues concerned with smallholder 
agricultural development. Topics have covered small scale irrigation, diversification 
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for sustainable food security, and an examination of the effects on small-scale 
agriculture of economic structural adjustment. 
As well as seminars FES is assisting the production of a ZFU radio programme and 
magazine for members. An ambitious training programme aims to undertake 1,200 
ward seminars for ZFU staff and members. Another of FES' s programmes concerns 
support and networking co-operation between farmer organisations within SADDC. 
They have an interest in linking of small-scale farmers with commercial agriculture 
and export as this is one of the aims of ZFU to encourage such joint ventures. 
3.2.5 An alternative approach: the CARE AGENT Programme 
An international NGO, CARE has a number of rural development programmes in 
Zimbabwe including garden clubs, credit for small enterprises, small dam 
development and rehabilitation, and an unusual agricultural dealership network. Its 
full title is Agribusiness Entrepreneur Network and Training (AGENT) programme. 
The AGENT programme commenced in 1995 and comprises a network of 17 village 
based dealers of agricultural inputs including fertiliser, crop chemicals, seeds and 
cement. It was designed in association with the Ministry of Agriculture and another 
NGO, the African Centre for Fertiliser Development (ACFD). 
The aim is to facilitate delivery of agricultural inputs to small-scale farmers in the 
communal areas, and to do this through establishing a network of community based 
agribusiness agents. In its first year of operations, the AGENT programme has 
provided agricultural inputs on a consignment basis, including fertilisers, seeds, crop 
chemicals and farm implements to 17 agents whose business activities are located in 
the Communal lands of Masvingo and Midlands Provinces. 
The programme is modelled on private sector agribusiness agent networks which have 
been established very successfully in South Asian countries, especially in India and 
Bangladesh. 
Community surveys were held on input needs and the agents were identified by the 
communities themselves as being people with whom they could do business and 
trusted. Some of the agents are women. In most cases they already have small stores 
and are established entrepreneurs. Agri-input inventory purchases worth 
approximately US$ 40,000 were made by CARE from suppliers on 90 day credit and 
distributed to agents on a consignment basis. The 17 agents collectively and 
individually submitted requests for agri-input stock. In mid-October 1995 CARE 
responded by provisioning the agents with the requested inventory. By February 1996 
this had been turned over three times and repayment levels to suppliers had reached 
50%. Amounts outstanding were secured by consigned inventory owned by CARE 
Zimbabwe and thus serving as collateral. Unsold inventory is periodically transferred 
between agents based on actual and projected sales patterns. Periodic training courses 
have been held for the agents covering dryland farming methods; product knowledge, 
selection, management and training of agents; agribusiness agent information 
networking and business methods. 
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CARE have commissioned an evaluation of the first crop season of this programme. 
They are aware of the current dependency on CARE but believe that eventually the 
agents will bulld up capital and no longer require financial or logistical support from 
the agency. This programme has in its design an Association of Agents who will 
network and exchange information on prices and suppliers. If the programme 
continues to make the progress already demonstrated it is likely to present a real 
challenge to the Masvingo Co-operative Union and its branches. MCU prices are 
known to be higher than the agents' prices and to stay in business the co-operative 
will have to achieve new levels of efficiency. 
It seems evident from the first year of the programme that there is a strong demand for 
fertiliser, seeds and crop chemicals in the communal areas and that the constraint in 
their use has been availability. Price may not be so important as availability. The last 
crop season was a good one with adequate rainfall but it was preceded by several 
seasons of below average rainfall and a severe drought in 1993. The agents will need 
to acquire considerable business acumen to stay afloat if the climatic changes, 
severely affect sales and usage. It is likely that other entrepreneurs may set up 
following the example of the CARE programme. This will promote a healthy 
competition but only those who stick to cash sales are likely to survive on a long term 
basis. 
This prograffilne could be replicated in other parts of sub-Saharan Africa and its 
progress should be monitored, as it could form a new component for development 
agencies in the aftermath of structural adjustment and the introduction of a liberalised 
economy. A dealership association committed to high standards of service, good 
coverage and harmonious price policies would represent a new form of African 
enterprise that is entirely relevant and much needed in rural areas. It would replace the 
input supply functions that have been poorly managed by so many co-operatives and 
take the need for managing trading activities away from farmers, allowing them to 
concentrate on the subject they know best i.e. production. 
An account of a visit to one of CARE's distributors is provided in Section 5. 
3.2.6 NGO concern for the environment and sustainable development 
All the N GOs visited in Zimbabwe appear to be taking a strong lead in their concern 
for sustainable development, bringing together organic farming, water conservation 
and the promotion of drought resistant crops with a clear eyed appreciation for the 
importance of identifying appropriate marketing opportunities for smallholders. In 
doing this they appear to be ahead of the Official Development Agencies who are still 
maintaining a more traditional approach to development which focuses on production 
facilities, formal farmer organisations and minimal support for marketing. 
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Section 4. Farmer organisations and groups in the provision of agricultural 
services: the role of commercial organisations 
Zimbabwe has a well established large-scale commercial farm~ng sector that has 
developed over many years. The commercial farming is well served by effective input 
supply and specialised commodity marketing companies and associations. The crops 
concerned are tobacco, sugar, maize, fruit and more recently high value export 
horticultural crops. Whilst the bulk of production is in the hands of large scale farmers 
(average farm size is 2,200 ha), small-scale farmers are increasingly becoming 
producers of these crops including tobacco, sugar and to a limited extent, babycorn 
and mangetout. In some cases private companies have taken an initiative in 
promoting, training and supporting the small-scale producers who market through the 
company. 
In this section examples are provided of private operators who have actively sought 
links with smallholders. Services provided by these companies vary, some have 
restricted their operations to procurement whilst others have become involved in pre-
financing producers and even providing training. The motivation behind these 
initiatives ranges from the strictly commercial (smallholders produce more cheaply or 
at higher quality) to the developmental (the need to create a more inclusive 
commercial agricultural sector). 
The role of groups in these arrangements varies. Where input distribution or the 
bulking up of a commodity for procurement is required by the company, groups can 
play an important role. Additionally, group guarantees are used for pre-financing by 
the Cotton Company of Zimbabwe. In other examples, groups are not important and 
in one case the commercial company does not encourage them at all. 
4.1 The Cotton Company of Zimbabwe 
The Cotton Company of Zimbabwe (CCZ), formerly the Cotton Marketing Board 
(CMB), is a semi-commercial company owned by government but required to operate 
on commercial lines. For the last three years it has been pre-fmancing groups of 
smallholder growers. This has been supported by lines of credit from the World 
Bank. Since its monopoly on cotton purchase was removed, the CCZ has faced 
competition from two buyers: COPRO, which does not provide any additional 
services to producers and Cargill, which has only entered the market this season and 
which at the time of this visit had not indicated what its strategy would be. 
Groups organise at the village level and are self selecting. They appoint a chairman 
who receives two weeks training in agronomy and legal matters from the CCZ (the 
company requires that all chairman are literate). The company arranges for the 
distribution of inputs (seed, pesticides and fertiliser) to transit depots from where the 
groups arrange collection and distribution. The company has a written contractual 
agreement with each grower which specifies the amount owed and requires the grower 
to sell the company 1 00% of his crop. If one member of the group reneges on this 
agreement, the whole group is penalised through the group chairman against whom 
the company can take legal action. This system is felt to be effective as it creates 
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strong incentives for the chairman and group members to screen out unreliable 
farmers. Equally, as the Cotton Company may represent the only financial institution 
available to smallholders in remote areas, incentives to maintain a good relationship 
with the company are high. 
The company provides its own extension support to farmers and also works through 
AGRJTEX. It regularly organises field days for its growers. At harvest it sends 
buying agents out to purchase from the groups and these agents are responsible for 
grading the cotton. Their ability to do this accurately is important because in order to 
create incentives for high quality production, the company pays farmers on the basis 
of the grade harvested. 
For the last two years the company has offered alternative marketing options to its 
farmers. The grower can take out a forward contract with the company which 
commits it to paying a guaranteed price; or the grower can put his cotton in the 
seasonal pool which is the aggregation of the year's trading. The grower receives a 
first payment under this system and the chance of a supplementary payment later in 
the season. In April 1995, the price offered for a forward contract was quoted as Z$ 
6.67 (B grade base price) and Z$5.10 for the seasonal pool. Farmers preferring to sell 
on the basis of a forward contract are required to commit a minimum of 50 tonnes and 
the company is actively encouraging its groups to bulk up to take advantage of the 
higher price. 
The company is pre-financing between 1,600 and 1,700 groups of about 30 farmers 
(approximately 50,000 growers), each with a holding of between 1 and 1.5 ha. The 
smallholder sector accounts for about 70% of national production and since the 
company started the scheme it has seen average yields among smallholders increase 
from 400-500 kg/ha to 800-1000 kg/ha. This it attributes to timely and adequate 
distribution of inputs. 
From a commercial point of view, the company is keen to retain its smallholder 
producers as they produce a higher quality of cotton than commercial growers (and 
quality carries a high premium on world markets). Whilst smallholders invest 
considerable time in pre-grading and will harvest over several days to obtain a 
maximum and high quality yield, commercial farmers employing contract labour 
produce a lower quality cotton as labourers are paid on the basis of volume rather than 
quality. To what extent liberalisation of cotton sales will affect repayment and the 
profitability of the scheme is likely to become apparent during the 1996 season. 
4.2 Chibuku Breweries 
Since 1989 Chibuku Breweries has been procuring sorghum from groups of 
smallholders in communal and resettlement areas. Although the quantity purchased 
from smallholders is only about 2% of the total, the company is keen to increase this 
amount as over the long term it anticipates that the quantity of sorghum grown by 
commercial farmers will decline as they diversify into higher value crops. 
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About 10 groups of between 20 and 300 farmers supply the company. The company 
selects the areas it works in on the basis of suitability for sorghum production. All the 
groups are in Regions 4 and 5 and are therefore dryland, drought prone areas where 
maize production is umeliable but a reasonable sorghum crop can be expected even in 
a dry year. 
The company does not normally pre-finance the crop, although after the drought of 
1995 seed was delivered on credit. Written agreements are not drawn up with the 
groups, nor are they required to produce a minimum tonnage. At harvest the company 
provides bags at a small fee to the group and arranges transport to the nearest brewery, 
a cost which is met by the farmers. From there the sorghum is transported to Harare 
at the company's expense. In contrast commercial farmers have to deliver to Harare 
entirely at their own expense. After the company has taken delivery of the crop and 
weighed it, officials are sent to the community within 3 days to pay the farmers in 
cash. 
The company works with AGRITEX to provide technical assistance to the farmers 
and regularly holds field days. Each group is required to provide the company with a 
list of members, including their farmer registration numbers and hectarage. It is also 
required to elect a committee. 
On the whole the company has been pleased with the performance of the scheme. As 
already indicated, it is in its long term interest to diversify its procurement base given 
the likelihood of decreasing supply from commercial farmers. The sorghum produced 
by smallholders is also of a higher quality as it is hand harvested. The company has 
experienced a few problems with the scheme as well, mainly as a result of leadership 
wrangles between groups. Despite this the company appears committed to the scheme 
and considers it to have gone well beyond a pilot phase. 
For farmers in Regions 4 and 5 participating in the scheme, the opportunity to grow a 
cash crop provides an important source of income in an environment where economic 
options are constrained. This is illustrated in the ITDG case study in Section 5.1. 
4.3 Hortico 
Hortico is a commercial horticultural company about 40 km outside Harare and is 
involved in growing high value crops for export. It is currently growing roses, fine 
beans, sweet corn, mangetout, babycom and evening primrose. These crops are 
packed and sent by air to Europe, Singapore and other markets. 
The vast majority of production comes from the company' s outgrowers who are 
commercial farmers in the area. A small number of smallholders are also producing 
for the company on existing small and often under-utilised, irrigation schemes. The 
company has assisted these farmers to set up overhead irrigation and trained them in 
the specific crop production, working closely with AGRITEX which has provided 
good support. It has also pre-financed growers, making deductions for loans from 
final payments. At present, three farmer groups are involved consisting of 120, 60 
and 20 fam1ers. The mangetout and babycom they are producing is of good quality. 
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The company would like to expand production among smallholders and involve up to 
3,000 growers. There are distinct commercial advantages to smallholder production as 
smallholders produce more cheaply than commercial growers and at a higher quality. 
In addition the capacity of commercial farmers in the area to produce is reaching its 
limit, requiring the company to look to new growers if it is to expand its operations. 
The company is presently reviewing forms of organisation and the financing of a 
proposed new business venture to incorporate smallholders. The company anticipates 
providing all the moveable assets (transport, cold stores etc.) as well as training and 
supervision, but it cannot pre-finance an expanded number of growers given the high 
risks involved_ Smallholders would have to finance themselves or seek loans. But 
according to the company's Financial Director, this represents a major problem: 
smallholders do not have the necessary security to get bank loans and even the 
Agricultural Finance Corporation, which used to be an easier source of financing for 
smallholders, will no longer make unsecured loans (see Section 1.2.3). In his own 
words, "cracking the working capital nut" is the major challenge facing the company. 
With regard to the organisation of smallholders within the business, the Managing 
Director expressed the view that he did not like the idea of farmers forming 
representative organisations. He sees two stakeholders in the business, the Company 
and the farmers as individuals. In his view therefore a co-operative or farmer 
association would come between him and the growers, having interests of its own 
which might conflict with his goals. 
Hortico's negative view of farmer organisation may reflect a concern that it will be 
politically motivated. It is possible that the company would take a less hostile view of 
farmer groups established to facilitate business between them. For example, in 
relation to financing, a group of farmers might be able to raise capital and attract 
production credit from a bank for its members more easily than farmers could alone. 
In the present system Hortico have a Smallholder Agronomist, Takunda Shava who 
organises and trains the farmers in the production techniques. There are sub groups of 
farmers and field supervisors that ensure that cultural requirements are followed and 
quality standards are maintained. 
Estimates of the establishment costs for 3,000 smallholders are Z$3m for capital costs 
and Z$3m for production credit. This is equivalent to £210,822 for capital costs and a 
similar amount for production credit. This would be £70 plus £70 per farmer and 
seems modest. The returns to the farmer per crop on a 20m by 20m plot are estimated 
at Z$200 (£14). Hortico were questioned on the seemingly low return of £14 net 
margin on a production input cost of £70 but stated that this was a normal return on 
this type of horticultural production. It is expected that a farmer would produce six 
crop cycles per year. This would give him an annual income of Z$1 ,200 from his 
20m square plot. 
These figures are based on the price paid by Hortico for the crop which takes into 
account the high cost of export and the risks involved. Some of the crops are sent to 
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trading floors overseas and there is no guarantee of the price achieved. In other cases 
crops are exported on a contractual basis where costs and returns are known. Hortico 
say that they are prepared to buy the crop from the farmer and accept the risk of 
selling it. 
With regard to the role of technical assistance provided by the Official Development 
Agencies, the MD takes the view that for too many years teams have been trying to 
promote production of vegetables using various forms of irrigation in Zimbabwe, with 
little or no attention to marketing. (see Section 3.1 above). The outcome of this 
official aid has had a strictly limited effect. Whilst it may have been technically 
successful, the end result is that people cannot sell their production effectively and 
improve their income in the way projected in project forecasts. 
He believes that far too much concessionary development finance has been applied to 
these less than perfect development programmes. He argues that similar funds should 
be made available on concessionary terms to commercial companies with professional 
staff who understand the market and are driven by sound economic principles rather 
than a weak mixture of social and economic goals. He beli~ves this is the only way 
forward in Zimbabwe and other parts of Africa 
4.4 Farmers Development Trust (FDT) 
The Tobacco Development Trust was formed in 1983 in order to meet a need for 
involving black farmers in flue cured tobacco production. More recently in 1993 the 
Trust changed its name to the Farmers Development Trust in order to reflect their 
more widespread interests in settling farmers on land for crop production other than 
tobacco. The Trust is heavily supported by the Zimbabwe Tobacco Association and its 
commercial members. Their mission is to facilitate the development of peasant 
farmers, through training to smallholder commercial producers who are expected to 
ultimately attain the status of fully fledged commercial farmers. The project goals 
include broadening of the agricultural production base by bringing in indigenous 
farmers into the main stream of sustainable commercial agricultural production. 
This is achieved by utilising farms purchased by the Government and settling farmers 
on 10 ha units after 10 months of intensive formal training in day centres. At each 
settlement scheme there is a Management Committee which includes representatives 
from AFC, AGRITEX, ZFU, CFU and a smallholder/tenant. Production is heavily 
supervised and all inputs are provided on credit through an AFC loan repaid by the 
smallholder from his tobacco sales proceeds (stop order). It is anticipated that after 
full training and an effective performance over 3 seasons, the tenant can qualify for a 
60 ha farm, eventually progressing to 100 ha. 
The Trust also undertakes training of communal tobacco farmers who produce 
significant quantities oftobacco which is sold in the Tobacco Auctions. 
The Trust has 1,074 settlers and some 10,000 ha under cultivation within this scheme. 
The Executive Director sees the scheme as a model for moving away from the social 
resettlement to economic resettlement. This is consistent with Government policy and 
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recent Ministerial statements that in future all resettlement will be allocated on the 
basis of purely economic criteria. 
The scheme appears to be highly managed with a considerable dependency of the 
tenants on the Trust's management systern, nevertheless it represents another linkage 
between com..-nercial crop production with its export marketing scheme and the 
linking of small-scale farmers who will eventually be commercial farmers in their 
own right. It will be interesting to follow up their plans for extending the model to 
other crop production systems in non-tobacco growing areas. It seems likely that the 
cost of training and supervision may well preclude any large scale implementation. 
An economic evaluation of the scheme would reveal the true cost effectiveness and 
potential for more widespread replication. 
In terms of this research study, it represents another example of linking small-scale 
farmers to existing commercial agriculture and the export trade which is vital to 
Zimbabwe's economic development. 
4.5 Sugar Association of Zimbabwe 
In 1981 just after Independence a settlement scheme was agreed between the 
Government and Mkwasine Sugar Estate which is owned by a group of commercial 
sugar companies. The agreement covered the allocation of 1,910 acres of prime 
irrigated sugar land into 191 ten hectare plots. Each plot had with it a small area of 
land with a basic two roomed house. The farmers were given a loan to help them 
produce their first sugar crop which was supervised by the estate management. It was 
anticipated that once the farmers proved themselves they would be given land titles. 
Water management is done by the estate but settlers manage their own overhead 
irrigation. It is estimated that the estate subsidises the electricity for the pumps by 
60%. All other production costs are the responsibility of the settlers. The crop is 
processed in the Company mill and the proceeds are divided with 30% retained by the 
mill as profit and 70% returned to the estate. Farmers are paid 85% of the estimated 
value of the crop shortly after delivery and the balance is paid after final sale proceeds 
are known. In practice deliveries of cane are made several times a year and so farmers 
have an almost regular cash flow. 
Annual production loans were made to the settlers by the Company until 1992 when 
there was a downturn in prices and the estate was short of cash so the Company 
withdrew from lending to the settlers. Today AFC provide production loans which are 
repaid through stop orders on the proceeds of the sugar crop after processing at the 
sugar mill owned by the Company. The average net profit from the 10 ha is around 
Z$200,000 and efficient farmers can earn up to Z$300,000 per year. 
The settlers representatives come together with Estate staff on a Management 
Committee which discusses all aspects of the scheme and reviews and monitors 
individual settlers progress. 
The scheme is recognised as a major success in Zimbabwe but it has a number of 
outstanding problems. Land titles have not yet been issued as the water rights are 
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unclear and some legal provision has to be made regarding use of the water. The titles 
are expected to be sectional leases because of the existence of some common assets. It 
is expected that a number of settlers would sell out as soon as they obtain a title. The 
land is extremely valuable and could be worth up to 4 times the annual profit i.e. Z$ 
lm. 
The relevance of this scheme to the research study is that it represents another 
example of farmer enterprise working closely in harmony with a commercial 
company which takes responsibility for processing and marketing. A fuller account of 
its operations is given in Section 5. There are other examples around Africa with 
similar systems. What is important in such arrangements is the need for maximum 
freedom for the individual producer and an equitable trading relationship with the 
commercial company so that each partner feels that the relationship is sustainable and 
transparent. 
4.6 Heinz Industries 
Heinz has been running a successful outgrower scheme among smallholders for the 
supply of beans for processing following the introduction of the Michigan pea bean 
which is used in making canned "baked beans". 
Procurement of sunflower for edible oil processing is not done through outgrowers 
and the company relies on farmers delivering oilseeds to the factory or on brokers 
who buy in the rural areas. Soybeans are purchased almost exclusively from large 
scale commercial farmers on a contract basis. On the other hand about 90% of the 
sunflower seed, which accounts for about a third of the company's total oilseed 
purchases (60,000 MT), is purchased from small-scale farmers. In discussion, one of 
the company's commercial directors expressed the view that there was definitely a 
role for farmers' groups to bulk up production for on-sale to the company on a 
contract basis, either through its own initiative or with the support of another 
organisation like the ZFU. The advantage to the company would be guaranteed 
supply and lower procurement costs and the farmers would benefit from a secure 
market. Additionally groups under the supervision of ZFU or AGRITEX could be 
supplied with improved seed with a higher oil content. In this way farmers would be 
able to market a higher value product increasing the incentives for the company to 
procure directly from them. 
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Section 5. Case Studies 
5.1 ITDG Groups and Chibuku Breweries 
As mentioned in Section 3.2.2, ITDG's work with farmer groups has led to the 
establishment of links between groups of producers and the Chibuku Breweries. 
The first group visited with an AGRITEX extension officer was in Ward 23 at 
Chitsika village one of several villages involved in sorghum crop production. A 
group of three farmers including one woman farmer described how their group was 
formed. Following initial meetings with AGRITEX and ITDG they had commenced 
development dialogues to analyse problems and selected persons had gone to Silveira 
House for training, paid for by ITDG. Village-based farmer groups were formed and 
these sent representatives to an umbrella committee composed of several groups. This 
association of village farmer clubs is unregistered but is organised with a Chairman, 
Secretary and Treasurer with Vice posts for each office. They meet when the need 
arises. A small joining fee is levied to cover travelling expenses of the committee 
members. The committee has 16 members and they visit Chibuku in Masvingo (100 
km) from time to time to discuss their production and crop availability. Similarly 
Chibuku staff come to field days and advise farmers on crop production, varieties and 
quality requirements. 
Each farmer has an average of 1.5 to 2 hectares of land on which they grow mainly 
sorghum now that they have a market for the crop. Other land is devoted to 
subsistence crops. They commenced selling in the 1992-3 season and last year the 
association produced 1,680 50 kg bags (84 tons) of sorghum which was collected by 
Chibuku in three loads. The farmers were clearly pleased with their transition from 
subsistence to cash crop farming but would like to be able to set the price for the crop 
themselves. They were receiving Z$1 050 a ton for the crop last year and confidently 
expect to receive more this year. Farmers stated that since starting cash cropping 
they had more money for school fees, food and health care and it was evident that 
many house improvements were taking place. 
This farmer enterprise promoted by ITDG and AGRITEX has been achieved 
essentially through dialogue and training with no material handouts or credit involved. 
The crop production method is largely organic and uses moisture conservation 
techniques. The association of farmers is non-trading and therefore requires the 
minimum of management and financial skills. Its main function is encouraging 
production of the cash crop and maintaining the linkage with Chibuku Breweries, who 
with AGRITEX provide any necessary technical information. Its activities do not 
necessitate formal registration. It is an easily sustainable form of farmer enterprise 
group. 
It is vulnerable in that it only has one buyer for the sorghum production and cannot set 
a selling price. All this may change in the future as more private buyers for crops are 
appearing in the provincial town. They may be able to take advantage of future 
competition for their crop production. They will need to guard against small time 
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private traders who may offer low farmgate prices at harvest. The main role of the 
Association will be to maintain the direct marketing linkage with the ultimate buyer 
and try to maintain fair terms of trade. 
A second group of farmers was visited in Ward 21 in Chivi District. The development 
approach was similar to that in Ward 23 with visible evidence that all the land had 
been carefully ridged along the contours to retain rainfall. The farmer interviewed, Mr 
Chiuswa, was a traditional Kraalleader and he said that as a result of ITDG's work 
his leadership position had been recognised once more. He had received training and 
had visited other groups of farmers, research stations and had received training in new 
ideas and technology. This had enabled him to increase production and market the 
surplus. Some of the members of his group were beginning to sell sorghum to 
Chibuku. 
Each village in the group of six in the area had a local farmers' group and they elected 
representatives to an Area Committee. They had re-introduced traditional labour 
sharing practices and had purchased donkeys for draught cultivation. The committee 
meets once a month and liaises with ZFU. They discuss problems and try to form 
linkages with other agencies that can assist them. 
In discussing what has changed for them since they became involved with the 
ITDG/ AGRJTEX programme, Mr. Chiuswa said that farmers had acquired a lot of 
knowledge and had learnt about dryland crops. They had also been able to find new 
markets for these crops. ITDG had fostered the spirit of working together. Groups 
compete against each other to produce the best crops, each member contributing a 
little prize money but the honour of winning is greater than the value of the prize. 
Later this month the groups will have a seed fair to promote good seeds and look at 
new varieties. 
When discussing problems, Mr Chiuswa said that the greatest problem was finding a 
buyer for sunflower. The members had asked ITDG and the Area Committee to help 
them find a buyer but without success so far. They would like to be able to sell the 
crop at harvest but there were no buyers around at present. He is looking to the 
association to solve this problem and they will re-emphasise it at the next meeting. 
His final words were: "As a producer I cannot set the price for my crop. When I buy 
from others they tell me the price." 
5.2 ENDA's seed producing groups 
As discussed in Section 3.2.3, ENDA is promoting farmer groups to undertake seed 
multiplication for a commercial seed company. 
Two farmer groups were visited at Mutabo some 150 km North East of Harare. One 
group is composed of small-scale settlement farmers and the other group are 
communal farmers. Using on-farm trials for varieties and palatability, these farmer 
groups have commenced multiplication of selected seed stock. An arrangement has 
been reached with the Zimbabwe Seed Company to purchase the sorghum and millet 
produced. The standing crops are inspected in the field by company inspectors and 
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given a certificate. The work has progressed from trial to semi-commercial production 
with the farmer groups linked to the marketing comp~y. The company sell the seed 
varieties within the SADDC region and this fulfils the aim of ENDA to network the 
seeds on a regional basis. 
The small-scale farmers group was composed of 25 f~ers having a committee of 8 
persons. Their average farm size is 10 ha and they devote at present 0.5 to 1 ha for the 
certified seed production. They are intending to increase the area dedicated to seed 
production. In addition they grow maize and sunflower and have attempted to grow 
babycom for another commercial horticultural buyer without success. The committee 
meets on an occasional basis when there is business to discuss. Their main topic is 
marketing and the identification of linkages with buyers. They do not trade and have 
no need of registration. They are an informal association. Their main function is 
liaison with ENDA and with the seed company. 
The group would like to create other linkages and has tried to sell babycom to Selby 
Enterprises. This company specified that the babycom must be harvested into a cold 
store and then transported to their processing plant in Harare. They obtained the 
assistance of ARDA who have a nearby cold store. ARDA agreed to collect the 
babycom and put it into cold store before transporting to Harare, requesting a 15% 
levy on the crop for this service. This was done in January 1996 but so far the farmers 
have not been paid for the crop in April. It is not clear where the payment problem is. 
This committee also arranges bulk orders for fertiliser and farm inputs and hires 
transport to collect these for the members. This example of a farmer enterprise group 
illustrates how a range of activities can be organised on a non-trading basis by an 
informal farmers association. Linkage and liaison are their main activities. 
Within the communal farming area, ENDA is working with nine farmer clubs each of 
9 or 1 0 members, one of which was visited during fieldwork. Each farmer has a total 
of about 2.5 ha. and grows 0.5 ha sorghum and millet. The group has a committee 
which meets when necessary. The communal farmers sell maize and sunflower to 
private traders who buy at the farmgate directly after harvest. The committee are 
unhappy with the price offered which is fixed on a take it or leave it basis. They state 
that it is difficult for them to aggregate their harvest and sell in bulk because some 
farmers need urgent cash as soon as their crop is harvested. The importance of the 
seed crop to these farmers stems from the linkage with the seed company and the 
assured market with transport provided by ENDA who collect the seed from 
designated collection points. 
The case of the communal farmers provides an example of how direct linkage with a 
buyer can assist groups but it also indicates some of the difficulties involved in group 
marketing. ENDA's support and the good price paid for seed provide strong 
incentives for the group to market together. But though they could probably benefit 
from taking a similar approach independently to marketing other commodities, urgent 
cash needs make bulking up difficult. 
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Last year the total seed produced from all groups in the five Wards was around 150 
tons. ENDA charge a marketing fee for this service and deduct Z$150 per ton which is 
equivalent to about 7 to 10% depending on the selling price. Some of the seed is 
retained by ENDA for further multiplication but the bulk is sold commercially. ENDA 
plan to set up some indigenous seed companies for specialisation 1n this type of seed. 
The Seed Company of Zimbabwe do not see sufficient demand for open-pollinated 
sorghum and millet seed to justifY their more direct involvement in this business. 
5.3 Mkwasine Sugar Estate Settlement Scheme 
The settlements are in several different groups and each of these groups of settlers 
have formed associations or co-operatives. The main function of the co-operatives is 
to provide labour sharing and to own and operate tractor hire. This has been done 
because the settlers have been able to offer members tractor hire at lower cost than 
hiring from the estate equipment pool. In some cases the co-operatives have run 
smoothly but in other cases disputes have resulted in a breakdown of the co-operation. 
Paul Kanyesi, one of the successful settlers now owning a new pick up truck and with 
investments off-farm says that he will probably sell his farm when titles are issued. He 
started without any knowledge of farming in 1982 and Mkwasine Estate provided 
everything for him, including Z$1 00 per month for the first two years. He is a Board 
member of the Pole Pole Co-operative and values the support he gets for labour 
sharing at harvest and the tractor hire service. The co-operative own five tractors and 
have built a beer hall for members. 
Twelve of the 191 settlers are insolvent but the rest farm with differing levels of 
efficiency. The estate management believe that overall they could raise the 
productivity by some 25 to 30% over the settlers output. One of the limitations ofthe 
scheme is that farmer have no means of expanding their land area and cannot reinvest 
profits in a larger operation. This has led to many of them investing in businesses 
outside the estate which take up management time and conflicts with their farming 
operations. 
The Field Operations Manager responsible for the scheme says that whilst it is 
regarded as a success, he would redesign the approach if starting again. He would 
make provision for larger plots to be available so that efficient farmers could expand. 
He would select farmers to join the scheme on the basis of farming 
experience/qualifications. Original settlers were ex-combatants with little or no 
experience of farming. The manager also believes that the imposed discipline by the 
estate in the e(lrly years helped to make the scheme a success. Even today settlers have 
obligations regarding rules for land use and conduct of farming operations. 
5.4 The CARE Dealership Programme 
A typical agent was visited in a village in Masvingo Province. Mrs Mutenda has run a 
village shop since 1983 and is one of three such shops in this large village. She was 
selected at a community meeting as the best person to be an agent. She is also the 
elected leader of a Women's garden group having 200 members growing vegetables 
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irrigated from a small dam which has been rehabilitated with the assistance of CARE. 
Her chosen stock includes compound and top dressing fertiliser, vegetable seeds, 
starter mash, cattle food, insecticides for garden, storage and home use, and cement. 
This season she has sold 80 bags of ammonium nitrate which is her best selling line. 
She claims to sell only on a cash basis and is well aware of the pitfalls of selling agri-
inputs on credit in a drought prone area. She has already made repayments to CARE 
and estimates a profit of Z$800 so far which she is keeping in a bank account to build 
up capital to finance her own stock. She estimates that it will require 2 or 3 more crop 
seasons with assistance from CARE before she can raise sufficient capital to finance 
the stock holding of the inputs. Her shop sells other commodities and she uses the 
profit on this to support her family. 
She has been advised by CARE on the buying and selling prices of all her stock and 
has good records. She admits that for the most part customers have a good knowledge 
of the price for each commodity and she herself regularly checks prices at other shops 
in the District. She buys compound fertiliser at Z$ 94.90 and sells at Z$104 (a mark 
up of $9.1 or 9.6% gross profit). She claims to have very little opportunity to adjust 
her prices because of competition. 
It seems clear that the success she has had in selling the inputs is due entirely to their 
availability in the area where they are needed. Until now farmers had to go to the 
District branch of Masvingo Co-operative Union and bring the supplies back on a 
mini-bus if a service exists. The CARE pricing policy includes an element for 
transport of the supplies to the agent. The transport was arranged by CARE in the first 
crop season but a new supplier has been found in Masvingo who is prepared to deliver 
direct to the agents. 
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Section 6 Conclusions 
6.1 Forms of group organisation: the decline of co-operatives and the 
significance of linkage arrangements 
Two features of the agricultural sector in Zimbabwe stand out in relation to the other 
countries visited during the course of this research. The first is that the existence of 
the commercial farmers in Zimbabwe has led to the development of a much more 
advanced agro-industrial sector in the country; and second, from a policy perspective, 
the government has maintained a more active role in agricultural service provision, 
even under the ESAP. The relevance of the first factor is that it has provided 
opportunities for the development of linkages between smallholders and commercial 
operators, as has been well documented in previous sections. With regard to the 
government' s role, the effect it has had may have been to discourage initiative among 
smallholders and emergent petty traders by perpetuating dependency on government 
handouts and marketing systems. These two features may be linked in that the 
absence of a strong marketing system may be encouraging processors to be more 
proactive in sourcing raw material supplies. 
The main concern of this study has been with marketing services (access to output 
markets and input supply, including financing). In many countries farmer co-
operatives have been promoted by government and donors as the best means of 
providing farmers with access to these services and as has been seen, Zimbabwe in 
the 1980s was no exception. During field work in Zimbabwe it became very clear 
however that many people across the agricultural sector feel that co-operatives have 
failed. Even the government's attitude is now purely pragmatic and it has made it 
clear that it will not continue subsidising loss making co-operatives. 
Given this background, despite wide consultation, little evidence was available to 
suggest that there are many viable farmer controlled co-operatives in Zimbabwe (with 
the important exception of co-operatives registered under the Companies Act which 
are run by commercial farmers) or that major donors are continuing to support the co-
operative movement. This contrasts with the situation in Uganda where large 
amounts of donor assistance are still going into co-operative reform programmes and 
in Ghana where TechnoServe, a prominent US NGO, is promoting the co-operative as 
an appropriate organisational form for smallholders. 
The apparent absence of viable formal co-operatives in Zimbabwe, especially at the 
primary level, had an impact on field work. Groups identified for case study work 
tended to be less formal and, because their operations were much more limited and 
they were not trading in their own right, they were without written records, bank 
accounts or formal procedures. 
As the case studies demonstrated, most of these groups were linkage groups, 
established with the private sector to link smallholders into larger production and 
marketing systems. Their role was primarily to co-ordinate marketing or input supply 
services, though if financing services were involved, as in the case ofthe groups under 
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the Cotton Company of Zimbabwe, they may have had a screening function or 
provided a mutual guarantee for loans. 
The role of groups in representing their members' joint interests to the buyers, or even 
in negotiating prices, was less evident (by contrast in Uganda vanilla associations 
gave price negotiation as one of their key functions). From an equity point of view, 
this would seem a very important role. However it was not a role that buyers were 
necessarily keen to see developed in Zimbabwe, perhaps because of fears that it would 
lead to a politicisation of producers (see Hortico's comments and comments made by 
US AID in Harare ). 
6.2 The promotion of linkage groups 
The fact that a number ofNGOs have been at the forefront of this linkage process may 
reflect the fact that the participatory methodologies adopted by them have increased 
client influence in designing projects. Research conducted since liberalisation 
demonstrates that access to marketing services is a priority need identified by 
smallholders (NRJ/ODI 1996). 
Another explanation for the NGOs' commercial orientation may lie in the fact that 
support for rural enterprise, as an alternative income source for agricultural producers, 
has been a feature of many NGO programmes in recent years. This has sensitised 
them to the importance of commercial as well as production issues. 
Finally, with more limited budgets than the official donors, there is much less pressure 
on NGOs to disburse funds, leaving them freer to develop an approach like that used 
by ITDG in Chivi where no material support was involved. As a result forms of 
community organisation and enterprise are not directed by external factors (for 
example a donated piece of equipment which must be managed and operated) but are 
intrinsic to the village and its own assessment of local priorities and capacities (and 
willingness to co-operate). By contrast, among official donors there are likely to be 
internal pressures to support projects that involve a high degree of disbursement, 
favouring projects where material assistance is a central component. But as the EU 
example demonstrated, if the organisational and financial skills are not already 
available in the community to manage resource inflows and there is little experience 
of co-operative action, the results can be very disappointing. 
6.3 The future role for policy makers and donors in promoting linkage groups 
The evidence suggests that linkage groups will be of increasing importance in the 
development of smallholder agriculture in Zimbabwe, replacing co-operatives as the 
most common form of group organisation at the community level for agricultural 
service provision. With respect to the present research, this raises a number of issues. 
Firstly, in relation to the formation of groups of farmers themselves, is there a role for 
an external agent and if so, what should this be? Zimbabwe provides examples both 
of groups which have formed directly in response to the opportunity presented by the 
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private interest (perhaps with support from AGRlTEX) and of other examples where 
an NGO has been an intermediary. 
Where NGOs have been involved, community mobilisation, the provision of 
marketing information and the training of group leaders have been their main 
activities. These activities have impacted positively on the communities involved in 
many more ways than through marketing linkages, as the ITDG .~ase study indicates. 
But how replicable is this approach, especially where success is linked to the 
commitment of a few highly skilled staff? 
The FAO's proposed Farm-level Applied Research Methods in East and Southern 
Africa (F ARMESA) project should shed some light on this issue, at least in relation to 
agricultural research, as it will attempt to institutionalise participatory approaches. 
These have tended to feature more in a project or NGO environment, where levels of 
resources and commitment are usually higher, than within government. 
Examples presented earlier in this study of the positive role played by AGRlTEX in 
liaising between groups of farmers and private interests, especially in relation to 
technical issues, suggests that marketing support (though not necessarily within the 
community mobilisation framework of ITDG) is already to some degree 
institutionalised. Further developing AGRITEX's capacity to advise and assist 
smallholders with marketing concerns in a participatory way might be a useful role for 
a donor to play. The ZFU represents another institutional pathway for introducing 
this approach. However it is important not to underestimate the potential difficulties 
of introducing a participatory approach into hierarchical and under-resourced 
institutions. Further research on the feasibility of trying to implement such a 
programme is recommended. 
If the government and donors were to give official support to linkage approaches, the 
issue of equity in farmer group/private company relationships would need to be 
addressed by policy makers. This is a highly sensitive issue and potential investors 
could easily be put off working with smallholders if they felt government was likely 
to try and regulate the prices paid to producers. On the other hand, government and 
donors cannot provide official support to forms of development which do not give 
proper attention to the interests of all concerned. 
A further issue is cost recovery. Private companies are already benefiting from the 
services of AGRITEX officers through the role they play in establishing links between 
smallholders. Although the relationship is providing mutual benefits to producers and 
buyers alike, it is taking place at a time when AGRITEX is facing a financing crisis. 
It is unlikely - and would be undesirable from an equity point of view - that 
AGRITEX could continue to extend these services without devising some mechanism 
to recover the costs involved from the direct beneficiaries. As many of the 
commodities produced under linkage arrangements enter relatively concentrated 
marketing and processing channels (for example most export vegetables are marketed 
through the Horticulture Promotion Council; and the CCZ's 7 ginneries account for 
80% of total throughput of raw cotton) it would be relatively straight forward for 
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AGRITEX to impose levies to recover costs (of course cost recovery mechanisms of 
this kind have fiscal implications which would have to be resolved separately). 
As already illustrated, linkage type groups are not as complex in character as formal 
co-operatives and therefore the need for their formal legal registration is much less. 
However where groups become involved in fmancing arrangements, either through a 
pre-financing agreement with a private company or through a bank, the lender is 
likely to require the group to have some legal identity in order for the loan to be 
secured. What this should be is an issue which could be investigated in further 
research. 
Leaving aside the direct promotion of farmer groups themselves, are there other roles 
that government and donors can play in promoting linkages between smallholders and 
private companies? 
One form of assistance suggested by the Managing Director at Hortico was for donors 
to provide financial assistance directly to the companies themselves. In his view 
donors would get a better return for their money by channelling funds directly to those 
with commercial expertise rather than into projects with managers who lack this. 
This approach has been accepted already by USAID. One way forward would be for 
donors to make available venture capital funds to set up or support businesses which 
could demonstrate beneficial linkages with smallholders. 
Another form of assistance might be with new varietal research or extension. 
Government would allow private sector interests to play a greater role in the 
prioritisation of public sector research and extension efforts. In Zimbabwe sunflower 
seed provides a good example of how such private/public co-operation could be very 
beneficial to smallholders: common sunflower varieties are very low in oil content, 
discouraging the processors from purchasing directly in rural areas. However with a 
higher oil yielding variety, farmers could offer buyers a higher value product, 
increasing the incentives for them to invest in better marketing arrangements in order 
to benefit from lower costs and increased output. 
On the other. hand, the direction of public resources to research and extension efforts 
where the benefits of such efforts are in the main captured by large commercial 
companies may not be very efficient from an economic point of view. The economic 
rationale for publicly funded research and extension is that it produces public goods, 
that is outputs which can be widely appropriated because exclusion is impossible. 
Where the beneficiary is a private interest, the use of public resources therefore acts 
like a subsidy. To illustrate this with the sunflower case, if a processing company had 
sufficient commercial incentive to promote improved sunflower varieties among 
smallholders, it would go ahead independently and recover the costs through the price 
paid for deliveries. 
The World Bank, has supported the Cotton Company of Zimbabwe by assisting with 
funds for pre-financing growers. Other donors could make lines of credit available to 
companies who wish to pre-finance their growers, perhaps on slightly easier terms 
than the commercial banks who demand very high levels of security. However there 
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is no certainty that companies would be prepared to borrow at their own risk to on 
lend to smallholders. The CCZ has until this year operated within a single channel 
marketing system, facilitating payments through a stop order system. Whether it will 
be able to maintain its operations in the face of competition for purchases will become 
clearer during the 1996 buying season. Hortico is much more cautious and is not 
prepared to take the risk of funding hundreds of outgrowers. The experience of 
outgrower type schemes in Sub Saharan Africa would seem to justify this caution 
(Stringfellow, 1996). 
In these circumstances, donors face two options: to shift the risk away from the 
company (by assuming more risk itself) or to develop new institutional arrangements 
which reduce the risk to an acceptable level. The first option discourages financial 
discipline by weakening the incentives for the company to strictly monitor its 
outgrowers and is not recommended. With regard to the second, the possibility of 
incorporating Zimbabwe's smallholder savings habit into a financing scheme seems to 
offer far more potential. Further research could investigate the feasibility of different 
arrangements involving smallholders, private companies and/or the banks where 
group savings mobilisation could be used to provide security deposits and thus reduce 
the lending risk to an acceptable level. 
Investment by the private sector in developing marketing systems will also be 
encouraged by improved infrastructure in rural areas. Donor projects to develop 
feeder roads and small-scale irrigation systems will increase the range of commodities 
smallholders can grow and their ability to market them. 
6.4 The Zimbabwe case study within the context of earlier research 
The research supports important themes identified during earlier research, both during 
the desk study and in earlier fieldwork. 
Evidence was found to support the idea that successful group enterprise appears to be 
closely linked to the ability of the group to insert itself into the mainstream economy. 
Closely related to this and despite some evidence of earlier support by official 
development agencies for projects without a marketing component, there does appear 
to be an awareness in the NGO community and increasingly among official donors 
that sustainable programmes require a greater emphasis on economic integration. This 
finding is consistent with findings in Uganda. 
Capacity building in order to assist this process is also an important theme coming out 
of the Zimbabwe work which is common to previous case studies. Capacity building 
is relevant at two levels: at the level of the community itself to provide the skills 
necessary for effective market integration and at the level of any intermediary 
organisation which works with farmers. This could be an NGO although in 
Zimbabwe it is more likely to be AGRITEX. 
In contrast to the experience of the co-operative reform programmes in Uganda and 
that of TechnoServe in Ghana, capacity building at the farmer group level in 
Zimbabwe has not involved a predetermined organisational structure. The NGOs 
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involved did not set out to promote co-operatives per se. Rather their approach has 
been to let communities determine for themselves what organisational structure is 
appropriate to their needs. In this context, and in a way similar to the approach taken 
by Mission Moving Mountains in Uganda, capacity building at the community level 
has meant giving the community the skills to determine and seek solutions to their 
own problems, emphasising self reliance. 
Further evidence was found in Zimbabwe of the type of supply driven donor 
programme that has the opposite effect, undermining sustainable enterprise and self 
reliance. The EU Mashonaland East project provides a clear example of how material 
assistance can undermine effective group organisation and make demands on groups 
that are beyond their capacity. 
The potential significance of links between farmer groups and private traders and 
processors identified in earlier work is amply demonstrated by the Zimbabwe 
experience. Key issues for policy makers and donors arising out of this experience 
have been identified above. Some of these require further research and in a final 
report for Phase I of this research, proposals to include some of these issues in 
research under Phase II will be outlined. 
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Appendix 1 
List of hypotheses to be tested during field work following the desk study in 1994 
1. That the promotion of Farmer Controlled Enterprises (FCE) is widely justified in 
the African context for the provision of financial, input supply and marketing services, 
but notwithstanding exceptions, are not widely justified for the development of 
milling, agro-industry and export-based activities. 
2. That features usually associated with success include: 
- a lack of political links 
- member homogeneity 
- primary organisations with between 8 and 25 members 
- a clear written constitution and set of membership rules 
- purely financial objectives 
- broad social objectives 
- a clear member-driven agenda 
- a high degree of self-financing 
- an absence of subsidised interest rates 
- starting with a single activity 
- effective structures of accountability 
- financial transparency and record keeping 
- strong individual leadership 
- participatory decision-making 
- heavy external training inputs in the early stages 
3. That NGOs specialised in small business and/or co-operative development are 
generally more effective in promoting FCEs (e.g. small group savings schemes) 
4. That financial sector reform and the establishment of a dynamic commercial 
banking sector are key steps in establishing effective primary level group enterprises. 
5. That donor largesse and lack of co-ordination are significantly undermining African 
initiative in creating sustainable and dynamic FCEs. 
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Appendix2 
Reference documents consulted during the research: 
Arnaiz Maria E 0, Merriii-Sands Deborah M, Berean Mukwende The 
Zimbabwe Farmers' Union: Its Current and Potential Role in Technology 
Development and Transfer, Agricultural Research and Extension network, ODI 
Atwood E and Takavarasha T Efficiency in Marketing Farm Products from the 
Communal Farm Sector of Zimbabwe, , FAO Series 
Bratton M Financing smallholder production: a comparison of individual and group 
credit schemes in Zimbabwe, Public Administration and Development, Vol. 6, 115-
132, 1986 
Care International Zimbabwe Information Pack, May 1995 
Care International Zimbabwe Agribusiness Dealer Development Network Project: 
Funding Application to Care Canada NGO Block Grant and Care Canada Innovation 
Fund, May 1995 
Couvreur Y Mashonaland East Fruit and Vegetable Project: Intermediate Report of 
the Institutional Development ofthe Horticultural Producer Associations, May 1995 
FAO Farm-level Applied Research Methods in East and Southern Africa 
(FARMESA) FAO project document 1996 
Jassat EM et al. People's Participation Project in Rushinga District, Mashonaland 
Central: A Mid-Term Evaluation Report, Zimbabwe Institute of Development Studies, 
Consultancy Reports 1 7, 1992 
Lovell et al. Small scale irrigation using collector wells pilot project, Zimbabwe, 
Final Report, Institute of Hydrology/British Geological Survey/Ministry of Lands, 
Agriculture and Water Development (Zimbabwe)/ODA, January 1996 
NRI "Zimbabwe: Overview of Agricultural Grain Marketing Reforms" in Practical 
implications of grain market liberalisation in Southern Africa, NRI 1995 
NRI/ODI Notes on field visit to Zimbabwe, February 1996 (draft) 
Periodic Market Pilot Project Final R~port and Handover to Ministry of Local 
Government and Rural and Urban Development, Maungwe District, Manicaland, 
Zimbabwe 
Rukovo A, Atwood E and Sithole G A Review of the Zimbabwe Tobacco Industry, 
FAO Series 
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Silveira House Annual Report 1995 
Stringfellow R An investigation of the organisational features, commodities and 
situations associated with contract farming and outgrower schemes in Sub Saharan 
Africa and of the factors which are critical to their success, NRI Research Report, 
February 1996 
Takavarasha T Chapter 5 "Zimbabwe" in Agricultural Policy Reforms and 
Regional Market Integration in Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe, Valdes and Muir-
Leresche Eds., IFPRI, 1993 
University of Leeds African Studies Unit The Organisation and Effectiveness of 
Co-operatives in Zimbabwe, Makoto Sato, 1988 
University of Leeds African Studies Unit The State and Agribusiness m 
Zimbabwe: PJ;mtations and Contract Farming, Lloyd Sachikpnye, August 1989 
Waughraf et al. Small scale irrigation using collector wells pilot project, 
Zimbabwe: Return to Households Survey Report, Institute of Hydrology/British 
Geological Survey/Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Water Development 
(Zimbabwe )/ODA, January 1996 
Wilborg H NF AZ and Popular Participation in Zimbabwe, A Minor Field Study, , 
Sveriges Lantbruksuniversitet, Uppsala, 1991 
World Bank Zimbabwe: Agricultural Co-operatives Sector Review, February 1989 
World Bank Zimbabwe: A Policy Agenda for Private Sector Development, June 
1993 
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Appendix 3 
List of Institutions and Persons Met During Research 
Government/Parastatals 
Mr Gideon Tsododo, Deputy Director (Field), Ministry of Lands, Agricultural and 
Water Development, Department of Agricultural Technical and Extension Services, 
PO Box CY 639, Causeway, Zimbabwe 
Tel: 794601/707311; Fax: 730525 
Mr Jaure, Project Co-ordinator for Mashonaland East Fruit and Vegetable Project, and 
Mr Yves Couveur, Institutional Consultant to the Project, Agricultural Development 
Authority, 3 McChlery Ave, Harare, PO Box 8439, Causeway, Harare 
Tel: 705841, 700095;Fax: 705847 
Mr Brighton Kutyauripo, Economist, Grain Marketing Board 
Donors 
John Hansell and Ms Sally Chakawhata, British Development Division in Central 
Africa, PO Box 664, 6th Floor, Corner Hse, Cnr. Samora Machel/Leopold Takawira 
St, Harare 
Tel: 738880/9; Fax: 738761; e-mail: bdcasc.bddca@oda.gnet.gov.uk 
Mr James Trehy, Agricultural Advisor, Delegation of the European Commission in 
Zimbabwe, Construction House, 6th Floor, 110 Leopold Takawira Street, PO Box 
4252, Harare, Zimbabwe. 
Tel: 707120, 752835, 722137, 707139, 707143; Fax: 725360/734084 
Mr Caesar Chidawanyika, Senior Programme Officer, World Bank Resident Mission 
in Zimbabwe, FINSURE House, 5th Floor, 84-86 Union Avenue, PO Box 2960, 
Harare 
Tel: 72961112/3; Fax: 708659; e-mail: wchidawanyika@worldbank.org 
Mr Bo Ghol, Co-ordinator, Farming Systems Programme FAO, PO Box 3730, Harare, 
Zimbabwe 
Tel: 758051; Fax: 758055; e-mail: fspzim@harare.iafrica.com 
Mr Donald Greenberg, Trade and Investment Advisor, USAID, PO Box 6988, Harare 
Tel: 793351; 720757; 720630, 721106; Fax: 722418; 720722; 
e-mail: dgreenberg@usaid.gov 
Farmers Organisations/NGOs 
Mr Enock Chikava, National Marketing Officer and Mr Vusa Nyakaza, Economist, 
Zimbabwe Farmers Union, Reliance House, First Floor, Speke Ave/L.Takawira St, 
PO Box 3755, Harare 
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Tel: 737733/4,751192,751748 
Mr Albert Vingwe, Chairman and Mr C Sadzamare, Agricultural Advisor, OCCZIM, 
Box 66102 Kopje, 25 Robson Manyika A venue, Room 102, Emekay House, Harare 
Tel: 737663 
Mr Mike Mispelaar, Director, CARE Zimbabwe, 8 Ross A venue, Belgravia, PO Box 
HG 93 7, Highlands, Harare 
Tel: 727986/7/8; Fax: 727989 
Mr Clever Mazhata and Mr Jestere Manyame, Field Officers and Mr Admore 
Mawere, Marketing Specialist, CARE, PO Box 264, Shop No 3, Dauth Building, 
Tongogora St, Masvingo 
Tel: (139) 64975; Fax: (139) 65140 
Mr Jim Emerson, Country Director, Plan International, Pvt Bag 7232 Highlands, 98 
Central A ve ( cnr 8th Street)Harare, Zimbabwe 
Tel: 708383/6; Fax: 708315 
Mr Itham Mhlanga, Programme Officer, OXFAM Zimbabwe 
Mr Freddie Kachote, Environment and Sustainable Agricultural Officer, Catholic 
Development Commission 
Mr Ebbie Dengu, Country Director and Mr Kudu Murwira, Project Officer, 
Intermediate Technology Development Group Zimbabwe, 2nd Floor, Gorlon House, 7 
Jason Moyo Ave., PO Box 1744, Harare 
Tel: 796420, 795232/3; Fax: 796409 
Mr Davison J Gumbo, Managing Director and Mr Takawira W.Ndiripo, Programme 
Manager, Sustainable Natural Resources Management Division, Environment and 
Development Activities-Zimbabwe, PO Box 3492, 1 Waterfield Road, Mt. Pleasant, 
Harare 
Tel: 301156/301162 
Mr Lovegot Tendengu, Executive Director, Farmers Development Trust, PO Box 
1 781, Harare 
Tel: 727441; Fax: 724523 
Dr Roland Schwartz, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Harare, Zimbabwe. Tel: 263 4 
723867; Fax: 263 4 723867 
Banks 
Mr Dell, Agricultural Officer, Barclays Bank, Zimbabwe 
Mr Chiri, Departmental General Manager, Planning and Control, Agricultural Finance 
Corporation 
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Private Sector 
Mr Charles Songore, Sales Manager, Small Scale Sector, Windmill Industries 
Mr Clarence Chari, Senior Buyer, Lever Brothers, Cnr Lytton and Stirling Roads, 
Industrial Sites, PO Box 950, Harare 
Tel: 753700/754990; Fax: 754980 
Mr P.S.Chingono, Commercial Director, Olvine Industries Ltd., PO Box 797, Harare 
Tel: 754556/64; Fax: 754565 
Mr Stanley Heri, Chief Executive, Horticulture Promotion Council, 113 Leopold 
Tak:awira St, PO Box 1241, Harare 
Tel:791881; 750754 
Mr Denis Zaranyika, Sales and Marketing Manager, Cargill Hybrid Seeds, Ist Floor 
Credsure Hse, 67 Second St, PO Box 5398, Harare 
Tel: 739313, 733436; Fax: 720980 
Mr Roland Murengwa, Buyer, Chibuku Breweries, Harare 
Mr I van Peterson, National Quality Controller, The Cotton Company of Zimbabwe, 1 
Lytton Rd, Workington, PO Box 2697, Harare 
Tel:739061/9, 739071/9; Fax: 708573, 753854 
Mr D.Rockcliffe, General Manager, Zimbabwe Sugar Sales (PVT) Ltd, P.O.Box 
2896. Harare, Zimbabwe 
Tel: 702885; Fax: 702889 
Mr Daniel Perlman, Managing Director, Mr Peter Mills, Production Manager and Mr 
Lester Dix, Financial Director, Hortico, PO Box HG 697, Highlands, Harare, 
Zimbabwe 
Tel: Town Office (4) 703838; Farm Office (74) 501/2 
Fax: Town Office (4) 708968; Farm Office (74) 503 
Mr John '.Viseman, Field Manager, Mkwasine Estate, P.Bag 7012, Chiredzi, 
Zimbabwe 
Tel: 2811/6; Fax: 3053 
Mr Tendai Tafa, Acting General Manager, Masvingo Co-operative Union, Box 930, 
Masvingo 
Tel: 62394 
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